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Recent years have brought remarkable growth in hybrid 
organizations that combine profit-seeking and social 
missions. Despite popular enthusiasm for such organizations, 
legal reforms to facilitate their formation and growth—
particularly, legal forms for hybrid firms—have largely been 
ineffective. This shortcoming stems in large part from the 
lack of a theory that identifies the structural and functional 
elements that make some types of hybrid organizations more 
effective than others. In pursuit of such a theory, this Article 
focuses on a large class of hybrid organizations that has been 
effective in addressing development problems, such as 
increasing access to capital and improving employment 
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opportunities. These organizations, which are commonly 
referred to as “social enterprises,” include microfinance 
institutions, firms that sell fair trade products, work 
integration firms, and low-cost sellers of essential goods and 
services such as eyeglasses, bed nets, and healthcare. The 
common characteristic of social enterprises is that they have a 
transactional relationship with their beneficiaries, who are 
either purchasers of the firms’ goods or services or suppliers of 
inputs (including labor) to the firm. The essence of this 
Article’s theory is that through these transactions, social 
enterprises perform a measurement role; that is, they measure 
or gather information on their patron-beneficiaries’ abilities 
to transact with commercial firms (for example, workers’ 
skills, borrowers’ creditworthiness, and consumers’ ability to 
pay). That information permits social enterprises to tailor the 
form and amount of subsidies to the specific needs of 
individual beneficiaries. This “measurement” function makes 
social enterprises relatively effective vehicles for allocating 
subsidies as compared to traditional donative organizations 
and other forms of hybrid organization, in particular firms 
that pursue corporate social responsibility policies. Thus, the 
measurement function can serve as the basis for designing a 
legal form for social enterprises. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been a remarkable increase in 
the number of organizations that combine profit-seeking 
with an altruistic or social mission. We can broadly term this 
class of entities “hybrid organizations,” though a variety of 
other terms have been used, including mixed-mission, 
blended value, triple bottom line, and creative capitalism.1 In 
particular, much attention—as well as legislative activity—
has focused on a broad but vaguely defined group of hybrid 
organizations that are commonly referred to as “social 
enterprises.” Common examples of social enterprises include 
microfinance institutions that provide credit to low-income 
borrowers, businesses that sell fair trade products, and 
companies that sell affordable products in developing 
countries. This  pursuit of a mixed commercial and social 
mission is not exclusively the domain of a small set of 
specialized firms. Multinational corporations such as 
Starbucks, Nike, and J.P. Morgan are increasingly engaged 
in a variety of corporate social responsibility initiatives.2 
Investors are increasingly mindful of social and 
environmental indicators in their investment decisions, and 
some focus on investing in firms that purport to generate 
social impact.3 Thus, there is a growing popular belief that 
combining profit and mission is an effective way of producing 
social wealth. 
Despite these wide-ranging developments, hybrid 
organizations remain poorly understood. As a result, legal 
 
1 The term “hybrid organization” is defined more formally in Part II. 
2 See infra Sections II.C, VI.A. 
3 See ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING: 
TRANSFORMING HOW WE MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE 
(2011); J.P. MORGAN GLOB. RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., IMPACT 
INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET CLASS (2010), 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/socialfinance/document/impact_
investments_nov2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/8762-2NCF]. 
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policy in this field has been haphazard and largely 
ineffective. First, there is some uncertainty about the extent 
to which business planners have the power to form 
businesses that combine profit and social missions. A recent 
Delaware case, eBay v. Newmark, casts doubt on the ability 
of corporations to espouse a social purpose.4 Partly to 
address this issue, new legal forms have been introduced to 
incorporate businesses that have a social mission.5 In 
 
4 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 28 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (“The corporate form in which [the corporation] operates, however, is 
not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends . . . Having chosen 
a for-profit corporate form, the [corporation’s] directors are bound by the 
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those 
standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the 
benefit of its stockholders.”).   The eBay case reflects the conventional 
view, dating back to Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, that the directors’ 
duty is to maximize shareholders’ profits. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); see 
also David A. Wishnick, Corporate Purposes in a Free Enterprise System: A 
Comment on eBay v. Newmark, 121 YALE L.J. 2405 (2012). The eBay case 
involved heightened scrutiny of a poison pill adopted by management in 
order to entrench a social purpose to which the shareholders had never 
acquiesced in the company’s charter or otherwise. eBay, 16 A.3d at 28, 32–
33. 
5 For reviews of the new legal forms, see Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Blended Enterprise and The Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105 
(2010); Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 
EMORY L.J. 681 (2013); Matthew F. Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: 
A Historical and International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291 
(2010); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise 
Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337 (2009); J. Haskell Murray, The Social 
Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541 (2016); Alicia E. Plerhoples, 
Social Enterprise as Commitment:  A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
89 (2015); Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter? 66 ALA. 
L. REV. 767 (2015); Fabrizio Cafaggi & Paola Iamiceli, New Frontiers in the 
Legal Structure and Legislation of Social Enterprises in Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis (Eur. U. Inst. L. Working Papers, Paper No. 
2008/16), http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/8927 [https://perma.cc/RCU5-
5SH7]; Rachel Culley & Jill R. Horowitz, Profits v. Purpose: Hybrid 
Companies and the Charitable Dollar (U. of Mich. Program in Law & 
Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 12-006, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2055368 
[https://perma.cc/T7LC-SDE6]. 
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particular, the Benefit Corporation is a legal entity that has 
a social mission but can nonetheless distribute profits to its 
owners. Although such legal forms have been diffusing 
rapidly among states, most hybrid organizations continue to 
use the traditional corporate forms. Thus, it is questionable 
whether the new forms are actually necessary and how such 
forms should be designed. Additionally, if hybrid 
organizations are desirable, they arguably deserve to receive 
tax or other subsidies. Malani and Posner, for example, 
propose that all for-profits should be provided with tax 
benefits for doing good things, such as selling fair trade 
products.6 However, trusting profit-driven corporations to 
employ subsidies towards social missions is highly 
problematic, mainly because they have an obvious incentive 
to overstate the social value of their activities in order to 
enhance their reputations.7 As a result, the IRS has so far 
resisted attempts to facilitate subsidized investments in 
hybrid legal forms.8 
The state of legal policy in this area stems from the 
failure of economic and legal scholarship to identify the 
structural and functional attributes that make hybrid 
organizations effective in addressing social problems. 
Despite the numerous colorful terms that have been attached 
to hybrids, most of these terms boil down to the idea of 
 
6 Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 
VA. L. REV. 2017, 2064–67 (2007). 
7 The well-known exposition of this view is by the economist Milton 
Friedman, who urged corporations to focus on maximizing profits for the 
firm’s owners while conforming to the basic legal and ethical rules of 
society. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970; see also Henry G. 
Manne, Milton Friedman Was Right, WALL. ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2006, 12:01 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116432800408631539 
[https://perma.cc/UY66-HZAS]. 
8 See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why 
Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially 
Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 
VT. L. REV. 273 (2010). 
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combining for-profit and altruistic missions.9 The problem is 
that, in most cases, it is practically impossible to measure 
and verify the accomplishment of altruistic goals.10 
The definitions of hybrids under the statutes for 
incorporating new organizational forms illustrate this 
difficulty. For example, the “Benefit Corporation” is a 
corporation whose purpose is to create a material positive 
impact on society and the environment.11 However, it is 
largely impossible to verify what qualifies as a “material 
 
9 See, e.g., THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE (Carlo Borzaga & 
Jacques Defourny eds., 2001); BUGG-LEVINE & EMERSON, supra note 3; 
Sutia Kim Alter, Social Enterprise Models and Their Mission and Money 
Relationships, in SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: NEW MODELS OF 
SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL CHANGE 205, 205–06 (Alex Nicholls ed., 2006); J. 
Gregory Dees, Enterprising Nonprofits, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1998, 
at 55; Jed Emerson & Sheila Bonini, The Blended Value Map: Tracking 
the Intersects and Opportunities of Economics, Social and Environmental 
Value Creation (unpublished manuscript) (October 2003), 
http://www.blendedvalue.org/wp-content/uploads/2004/02/pdf-bv-map.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FVY6-MHBQ]. 
10 Moreover, there is a tendency to treat the difference between 
corporate social responsibility and social enterprise as mainly one of 
degree, without delineating their different structures or functional roles. 
See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE WORLD OF 
SOCIAL ENTERPRISES 7 (Leonardo Becchetti & Carlo Borzaga eds., 2011); 
Alter, supra note 9; Kelley, supra note 5, at 350–52; Janet E. Kerr, The 
Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility 
Through A Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831 (2008); Dana Brakman 
Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2450 (2009) 
(arguing that “[s]ocial enterprises integrate philanthropy into their 
business models at a more basic level than companies that make corporate 
contributions or practice [Corporate Social Responsibility]”). In fact, the 
terms are often used interchangeably to denote essentially the same type 
of business.  To take one example, firms that sell fair trade products have 
been referred to as a social enterprise, THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra, corporate social responsibility initiative, Michael 
E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between 
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Dec. 2006, at 78, and corporate philanthropy, Malani & Posner, 
supra note 6. 
11 See infra Section IX.A. 
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positive impact,” and while the Benefit Corporation is a 
laudable attempt to encourage corporations to produce such 
an impact, it is highly doubtful that it has achieved this 
effect. A recent example is Laureate University, a for-profit 
network of universities incorporated as a Benefit 
Corporation. Laureate recently completed its celebrated IPO, 
the first of any Benefit Corporation.12 It is difficult, however, 
to see what makes Laureate different from standard for-
profit firms in the same industry. Recent evidence suggests 
that it employs aggressive promotional tactics, suffers from 
low graduation and loan repayment rates in some regions, 
and primarily serves the premium segment of the market.13 
While not incorporated as hybrids, the experiences of other 
large companies that vowed to serve social and 
 
12 See Alex Barinka, Laureate Education Plans IPO as a Public 
Benefit Company, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2015, 5:37 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-02/kkr-backed-laureate-
education-files-for-initial-public-offering [https://perma.cc/8GA4-G69A]; 
Natalie Sherman, Laureate Becomes Public Company Again, Raising $490 
Million, BALTIMORE SUN (Feb. 1, 2017, 7:52 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-laureate-ipo-20170201-
story.html [https://perma.cc/6KHP-HJA6]. 
13 See, e.g., Laureate Education Inc. Registration Statement (Form S-
1) (Oct. 2, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912766/000104746915007679/a22
09311zs-1.htm [https://perma.cc/A2F6-FJJL]; John Fritze & Natalie 
Sherman, Laureate IPO Still Pending Amid Political Flap, Industry 
Crackdown, BALTIMORE SUN, 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-laureate-faces-
challenges-20161008-story.html [https://perma.cc/G3NA-UMXW] (Oct. 10, 
2016, 7:17 PM); Janet Lorin, Laureate's U.S. Students Struggling to Repay 
Loans as IPO Looms, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2015, 5:00 AM) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-11-04/laureate-loan-
repayment-rate-shows-u-s-debt-burden-as-ipo-looms 
[https://perma.cc/2FU5-EQZP]; Michael Smith & Mina Kimes, Chilean 
Regulators Say No to Clinton-Backed University, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 
2014, 2:58 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-
24/chilean-regulators-crack-down-on-university-with-ties-to-clinton 
[https://perma.cc/P8VG-QXD2]. 
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environmental missions, including Google, Etsy, and even 
British Petroleum, range from disappointing to egregious.14 
In order to develop legal policy in this area, there is a 
need for a theory that identifies a set of organizations that 
actually have incentives to pursue social missions effectively 
and explains their functional role. This Article offers a 
theory of social enterprise and hybrid organizations that can 
inform legal policy. The theory focuses on a set of 
organizations that are commonly referred to as “social 
enterprises,” such as microfinance institutions, firms that 
sell fair trade products, work integration social enterprises, 
and low-cost sellers. The common characteristic of these 
organizations is that they have a commitment to transacting 
with their beneficiaries, who are either purchasers of the 
firm’s goods or services or suppliers of inputs (including 
labor) to the firm. This Article will refer to such beneficiaries 
as “patron-beneficiaries.”15 For example, microfinance 
institutions make loans to low-income borrowers, and work 
integration social enterprises employ disadvantaged 
workers. As this Article explains in greater detail below, it 
may be prohibitively costly for standard commercial firms to 
transact with disadvantaged individuals. This occurs for two 
reasons: (1) firms lack information to evaluate the abilities of 
such individuals, or (2) such individuals lack sufficient 
abilities (e.g., ability to repay a loan). In these 
circumstances, disadvantaged individuals may suffer from 
lack of access to capital, systematic unemployment, and 
want of essential products and services. Social enterprises 
 
14 As discussed in Section VI.A below, Google’s charitable arm has 
had limited social impact; Etsy, an online marketplace for crafts, is 
certified by B-Lab, a nonprofit that certifies and ranks firms as producing 
public benefits, but is also allegedly involved in aggressive tax planning. 
See infra Section VI.C. Finally, British Petroleum, a company that had a 
strong reputation for adopting environmentally friendly policies, was 
responsible for a major oil spill in 2010. See infra Section VI.D. 
15 The term “patron” is used to refer to those who have a transactional 
relationship with the firm, i.e., investors, workers, suppliers, etc. 
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address these problems by committing to transacting with 
disadvantaged individuals as patrons. 
This commitment induces social enterprises to perform a 
measurement role. The financial viability of social 
enterprises depends in large part on the performance of their 
patron-beneficiaries. For example, microfinance institutions 
are financially dependent on the ability of their borrowers to 
repay their loans. Thus, social enterprises have incentives to 
measure or gather information on their patron-beneficiaries’ 
attributes (e.g., workers’ skills or borrowers’ 
creditworthiness) in order to ensure that they are capable of 
performing their duties and tasks under their transactional 
relationship with the social enterprise firm. This information 
enables social enterprises to allocate subsidies (e.g., a 
training subsidy) to their beneficiaries (e.g., disadvantaged 
workers) effectively. In particular, social enterprises have 
the ability and incentives to tailor the form and amount of 
subsidies to their beneficiaries’ abilities and preferences as 
well as the commercial needs of their business. 
The measurement function makes social enterprises 
relatively effective vehicles for allocating subsidies to 
promote development goals, such as increasing access to 
capital, enhancing productivity and employment 
opportunities, and enhancing consumer welfare. For 
example, microfinance institutions have grown substantially 
in the last few decades and now provide financial services to 
millions of poor customers in developing countries.16 
The relative success of microfinance and other social 
enterprises in spurring development contrasts with the 
limited effectiveness of many organizations that engage 
primarily in giving to beneficiaries (as opposed to 
transacting with them), such as donative organizations like 
 
16 BEATRIZ ARMENDÁRIZ & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF 
MICROFINANCE 12–15 (2nd ed. 2010); BRIGIT HELMS, ACCESS FOR ALL: 
BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 2–5 (2006). 
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government and aid agencies.17 Social enterprises also need 
to be contrasted with other forms of hybrid organizations, 
especially firms that engage in corporate charity and social 
responsibility policies. Whereas social enterprises have 
incentives to utilize subsidies effectively, corporations that 
pursue socially responsible policies have incentives to 
exaggerate their social value. 
From a theoretical perspective, this Article contributes to 
understanding the functional role of different forms of 
organization. The theory proposed is related to the well-
known “metering” theory of Alchian and Demsetz, which 
argues that firms arise as a solution to problems in metering 
or measuring input productivity and rewards,18 and that 
nonprofits are likely to shirk because they have limited 
incentives to meter productivity.19 However, unlike Alchian 
 
17 The term “donative organization” was defined by Hansmann to 
mean nonprofits that receive most or all of their income in the form of 
grants or donations. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit 
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 840 (1980). This Article will argue that 
donative organizations are also characterized by the fact that they 
transfer a subsidy to their beneficiaries rather than transacting with them 
as patrons. See infra Part II. 
18 As stated by Alchian and Demsetz: “If the economic organization 
meters poorly, with rewards and productivity only loosely correlated, then 
productivity will be smaller; but if the economic organization meters well 
productivity will be greater.” Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 777, 779 (1972). More broadly, Alchian and Demsetz seek to explain 
why firms are an efficient means for organizing economic activity (as 
opposed to contracts) when individual output is difficult to observe but 
collective output is observable. Id. 
19 Id. at 789–90. In contrast, as shown by Hansmann, supra note 17, 
nonprofits may actually have stronger incentives to produce higher 
quality. See also Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-For-Profit 
Entrepreneurs, 81 J. OF PUB. ECON. 99 (2001) (developing an economic 
model of Hansmann’s theory); cf. Albert H. Choi, Nonprofit Status and 
Relational Sanctions: Commitment to Quality through Repeat Interactions 
and Organizational Choice, 58 J.L. & ECON. 969 (2015) (offering an 
economic model where stronger relational sanctions by consumers against 
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and Demsetz, this Article draws a distinction between 
transacting and giving organizations, rather than 
emphasizing the distinction between for-profits and 
nonprofits.20 The reason is that social enterprises that 
engage in market transactions may be formed not only as 
for-profits, but also as nonprofits, and in either case, they 
have a financial (as well as altruistic) incentive to measure 
the output of their beneficiaries and to tailor subsidies to 
their needs. 
From a policy perspective, understanding the basic 
structure of social enterprises and the measurement function 
they perform is essential for informing policies to encourage 
corporations to pursue social missions. Since social 
enterprises appear to be effective, legal policy should 
primarily foster organizations that share their structural 
and functional attributes. Section IX outlines how the 
transaction with beneficiaries and the measurement role of 
social enterprises can provide a normative framework for 
designing a legal hybrid form.21 This Article focuses on 
laying out the structural and theoretical underpinnings of 
social enterprises as well as other hybrid organizations. 
This Article is organized as follows: Section II discusses 
the structure of different forms of hybrid organizations, and 
in particular social enterprises. Section III describes in detail 
the measurement theory of social enterprise. Section IV 
applies the theory to different forms of social enterprises. 
Section V describes the different devices social enterprises 
employ to commit to transacting with disadvantaged groups. 
 
for-profits cause for-profits to produce quality equivalent to that of 
nonprofits). 
20 To be fair, Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 18, wrote at a time when 
nonprofits were less commercialized and hence less likely to engage in 
market transactions. For discussion of the commercialization of nonprofits, 
see TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT:  THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998). 
21 See infra Section IX. Details of the policy implications are discussed 
in Ofer Eldar, Designing Organizations to Pursue Social Goals: An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Hybrid Forms (on file with author). 
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Section VI contrasts social enterprises with other hybrid 
organizations that engage primarily in giving to beneficiaries 
rather than transacting with them. Section VII notes several 
disadvantages of social enterprises. Section VIII explains 
why other theories of hybrid organizations fail to explain the 
structure and role of hybrid organizations. Section IX 
discusses why legal hybrid forms have been largely 
ineffective in encouraging firms to address social missions 
and how the theory put forth in this Article can inform the 
design of a new legal hybrid form. 
II. THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
SOCIAL ENTERPRISES AND HYBRID 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Although hybrid organizations are commonly defined as 
organizations that combine profit and altruistic or social 
missions, this definition is misleading. Even profit-
maximizing firms pursue social purposes, albeit indirectly. 
Consider a food chain that improves the nutritional value of 
its products. Such a firm may be maximizing its profits by 
making its products more attractive to customers. Its 
activities may well generate positive externalities, such as 
better health for society. This firm, however, is not 
conceptually different from most other for-profit firms. The 
idea that firms generate positive externalities while 
pursuing profits dates back to Adam Smith’s notion of profit 
maximization.22 A useful definition of hybrid organizations 
must identify the way they differ from standard profit-
maximizing firms. 
Properly defined, a hybrid organization is a commercial 
enterprise that channels a subsidy to a class of beneficiaries. 
The simplest example is a corporate charity, which is a for-
profit firm that donates a percentage of its profits to charity. 
The subsidy need not be provided by the government and 
 
22 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
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usually flows from the firm’s customers and investors. To 
fund the charity, the owners of the firm may agree to some 
discount on their returns or the consumers may pay 
premium prices for the firm’s products. Thus, this Article 
defines “subsidy” expansively to include any contribution of 
value—monetary or otherwise—that is provided to the 
ultimate beneficiary of the subsidy for no consideration. It 
need not be a direct subsidy, like a grant or a donation, but 
may also take the form of premiums over market prices paid 
by consumers or discounts to market returns on 
investment.23 
It is important to note that the term “hybrid 
organization” can be used to describe a wide array of 
organizations. On one hand, a hybrid organization may be 
profit-maximizing as long as the owners do not provide the 
subsidy. For example, a firm may receive a grant from the 
government or its consumers may pay premium prices. On 
the other hand, hybrid organizations may be nonprofits. A 
commercial enterprise is any enterprise that receives a 
significant portion of its income from prices charged for its 
products or services so that its viability or sustainability is 
dependent on such income.24 Commercial enterprises include 
not only for-profit firms, but also commercial nonprofits such 
as hospitals or universities that charge patients and 
students respectively for their services,25 despite receiving at 
least some subsidies in the form of donations and tax 
exemptions. 
 
23 The difference between premium prices or below-market rates and 
market prices or rates (as applicable) constitutes the subsidy. 
24 This Article refers to “enterprises” rather than organizations or 
entities. An enterprise may comprise an entity or several entities, but may 
also be a segment of an organization that includes various types of 
enterprise. 
25 See Hansmann, supra note 17, at 840–41. 
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A. What Makes an Organization a Social Enterprise? 
The focus of this Article is on a particular type of hybrid 
organization, usually referred to as a “social enterprise.” 
Social enterprises are not only subsidized commercial 
enterprises, but they also possess another critical element: 
they have a commitment to transact with their beneficiaries 
as patrons, for instance, as customers or providers of input 
(see Figure 1). This commitment arises in circumstances 
where such beneficiaries are unable to transact with 
commercial firms under standard commercial terms. For 
example, microfinance institutions lend money to their 
beneficiaries, who are disadvantaged individuals or 
businesses that face difficulties in obtaining capital from 
commercial lenders. Section III presents the economic 
function of this transactional relationship. Social enterprises 
do not necessarily transfer subsidies to their patron-
beneficiaries (e.g., discounts on loans or products), although 
many of them do. To count as social enterprises, they need 
only have a commitment to transact with their beneficiaries, 
even if no actual transfer of subsidies is made to the 
beneficiaries. 
1. Examples of Social Enterprises 
The following paragraphs describe the business and 
structure of different types of social enterprise. All of the 
social enterprises described engage in development missions, 
such as increasing access to capital, improving productivity 
and employment opportunities, and enhancing consumer 
welfare. The description does not exhaust all forms of social 
enterprise; rather, this Article provides an example of each 
of the main industries in which social enterprises operate. 
For present purposes, the Article will focus on for-profit 
social enterprises and discuss social enterprises formed as 
nonprofits in the following Section. 
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Microfinance Institutions (“MFIs”): MFIs provide 
loans and other financial services to poor customers in 
developing countries who lack access to capital. MFIs 
specialize in making small short-term loans, which are 
unprofitable for commercial banks but are essential for poor 
households and small businesses in developing countries. A 
well-known MFI is Compartamos, which lends mainly to the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Donors/ 
Government 
Employees/ 
Managers  
Patron - 
Beneficiaries 
Social 
Enterprise 
Customers Owners/ Investors 
FIGURE 1: SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
A social enterprise is a subsidized commercial enterprise (for-profit or 
nonprofit) with a commitment to transacting with a class of patron-
beneficiaries. The patron-beneficiaries may belong to any class of the 
firm’s patrons, including some or all of its customers, employees, or 
suppliers.  The subsidy to the firm may be provided by donors, 
government or any other class of patrons. A one-sided light grey arrow 
is used to denote a subsidy. A two-sided dark grey arrow is used to 
denote a transactional relationship with a patron.  
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moderately poor. Compartamos is a for-profit owned by a 
consortium of NGOs, foundations and social entrepreneurs. 
Although it underwent an IPO in 2007, the consortium 
shareholders continue to own a controlling interest in the 
company.26 The NGOs and the International Finance 
Corporation provided the initial subsidy to the firm in the 
form of seed capital, which was funded by donations. In 
addition, the owners may provide a subsidy to the firm to the 
extent that the firm forgoes opportunities to serve wealthier 
individuals. Although Compartamos has been very 
profitable, it could arguably be more profitable if it served 
more affluent borrowers.27 Compartamos does not transfer 
subsidies directly to its customer-beneficiaries like other 
MFIs, for example in the form of lower rates;28 rather, the 
main benefit it confers on them is the opportunity to borrow. 
Credit Development Financial Institutions 
(“CDFIs”): CDFIs provide financial products to low-income 
customers in the U.S. that are generally not available from 
 
26 COMPARTAMOS, S.A.B. DE C.V., 2012 ANNUAL AND SUSTAINABLE 
REPORT 86 (2013), https://www.compartamos.com/wps/themes 
/html/mango/media/CompartamosInformeWeb2012/compartamos%20ingle
s/pdfs/informe_anual_y_sustentable_2012_Grupo_Compartamos.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/GV5M-KE7B]; BANCO COMPARTAMOS, S.A., OFFERING 
CIRCULAR 127–28 (2007), https://www.compartamos.com/wps/wcm/connect 
/?MOD=PDMProxy&TYPE=personalization&ID=NONE&KEY=NONE&LI
BRARY=%252FcontentRoot%252Ficm%253Alibraries&FOLDER=%252FR
elacion+con+Inversionistas%252FInformacion+Corporativa%252FProspect
o+de+Colocacion+En%252F&DOC_NAME=%252FcontentRoot%252Ficm%
253Alibraries%252FRelacion+con+Inversionistas%252FInformacion+Corp
orativa%252FProspecto+de+Colocacion+En%252FProspecto+de+Colocacio
n+Ingles+(Offerong+circular).pdf&VERSION_NAME=NONE&VERSION_
DATE=NONE&IGNORE_CACHE=false&CONVERT=text/html&MUST_C
ONVERT=false [https://perma.cc/HKT3-6RA7] [hereinafter COMPARTAMOS 
OFFERING CIRCULAR]. 
27 On the other hand, the most profitable strategy for Compartamos 
may be to specialize in loans to the moderately poor, in which case no 
further subsidy is provided by the owners (other than the seed capital). 
28 In fact, its rates are known to average nearly 90%. See Michael 
Chu, Commercial Returns at the Base of the Pyramid, INNOVATIONS, 
Winter/Spring 2007, at 115, 126. 
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mainstream commercial banks, particularly depository 
services, home mortgages, and loans to small businesses. An 
example of a CDFI is the Carver Federal Savings Bank, a 
New York bank created to serve low-income African-
American communities.29 The bank is held by Carver 
Bancorp, Inc., a holding company whose shares are traded on 
the NASDAQ.30 CDFIs are certified as such by a government 
agency, the CDFI Fund, which provides subsidies to CDFIs 
in different forms, including subsidized equity investments, 
guaranties, and grants.31 To be certified, a firm must satisfy 
certain requirements to lend to low-income borrowers.32 The 
CDFI Fund also enters into an Assistance Agreement with 
each CDFI that is awarded assistance.33 The agreement 
incorporates performance goals to be accomplished by the 
CDFI, the scale of its activities, and the terms offered to low-
income borrowers (e.g., below-market rates).34 Equity 
investors in CDFIs are typically also eligible for tax credit 
incentives under the New Markets Tax Credits program.35 
 
29 See CARVER BANCORP, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 3 (June 
29, 2015), http://www.snl.com/interactive/lookandfeel/112079/ 
AnnualReport_ 2015_.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX4R-QWZA]. 
30  See Corporate Profile, CARVER FED. SAV. BANK, 
http://www.snl.com/irweblinkx/corporateprofile.aspx?iid=112079 
[https://perma.cc/QTG3-K2ZU] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
31 See Lehn Benjamin et al., Community Development Financial 
Institutions: Current Issues and Future Prospects, 26 J. URB. AFF. 177, 
177–79 (2004); CDFI Types, CDFI COALITION, http://www.cdfi.org/about-
cdfis/cdfi-types/ [https://perma.cc/3DF4-NFLZ?type=image] (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2017). 
32 For example, an applicant for CDFI certification must serve a 
Target Market, which is defined to include areas where the percentage of 
the population living in poverty is at least 20%, where the median family 
income is below 80% of the national median family income, or where the 
unemployment rate is 1.5 times the national average. See 12 C.F.R. § 
1805.201(3) (2016). 
33 12 C.F.R. § 1805.801 (2016). 
34 Id. 
35 See Julia Sass Rubin & Gregory M. Stankiewicz, The New Markets 
Tax Credit Program: A Midcourse Assessment, 1 COMMUNITY DEV. INVEST. 
REV. 1, 3 (2005). 
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Social Investment Firms: Social investment firms make 
relatively small investments in businesses, including in 
other social enterprises, which are perceived as too risky for 
commercial investors, such as private equity and venture 
capital firms. While some social investment firms aim at 
earning near-competitive returns, others expect below-
market returns.36 Triodos Bank N.V., a bank based in the 
Netherlands, lends to businesses and nonprofits that have 
some social or ecological benefit, such as MFIs, fair trade 
social enterprises (discussed below), organic farms, and 
renewable energy projects.37 The subsidy in the case of 
Triodos Bank flows from its equity holders that hold 
depository receipts and earn only moderate returns on 
equity.38 The depository receipts are publicly listed and 
traded on a matched bargain system.39 The voting rights in 
Triodos Bank are held by a foundation which makes voting 
decisions on behalf of the holders of depository receipts, and 
is required to exercise its voting rights in a manner 
consistent with its ethical goals and mission, its business 
 
36 J.P. MORGAN GLOB. RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., supra 
note 3, at 6; ROCKEFELLER PHILANTHROPY ADVISORS, SOLUTIONS FOR IMPACT 
INVESTORS: FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION 11–12 (2010), 
http://www.rockpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/MONO-
SolutionForImpactInvestors2.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8Y5-T58H]; MONITOR 
INST., INVESTING FOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: A DESIGN FOR 
CATALYZING AN EMERGING INDUSTRY 31 (2009), 
http://monitorinstitute.com/downloads/what-we-think/impact-
investing/Impact_Investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TNY-TME7]. 
37 What We Do, TRIODOS BANK, https://www.triodos.com/en/about-
triodos-bank/what-we-do/ [https://perma.cc/M4QN-AY8G] (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2017). 
38 TRIODOS BANK, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2016), 
https://www.triodos.com/downloads/about-triodos-bank/annual-
reports/triodos-bank-annual-year-report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP6Q-
MKDW] [hereinafter TRIODOS BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2015]. The return on 
equity in 2015 was 5.5% (up from 4.4% in 2014). Id. 
39 A matched bargain system is a system for trading stocks that 
matches a buy offer directly with a sell offer. Such a system tends to be 
less liquid than standard stock exchanges.  
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interests, and the interests of the depository receipt 
holders.40 
Low-Cost Sellers: There are various types of 
organizations that sell affordable products or services to poor 
customers in developing markets, such as bed nets, 
eyeglasses, and healthcare services.41 A to Z Textile Mills of 
Tanzania is a producer of long-lasting insecticide-treated bed 
nets.42 A to Z is a for-profit firm that entered into a 
partnership that includes the World Health Organization, 
NGOs, and other large commercial firms. Pursuant to the 
partnership, A to Z is committed to selling bed nets in 
Tanzania, and the other partners provide it with various 
forms of subsidy, such as free use of technology and loans at 
below-market rates to buy machinery and specialized 
chemicals.43 A to Z employs a price differentiation scheme, 
whereby bed nets are either sold at market price ($5 each) or 
through the partnership to vulnerable groups at a discount 
paid by the partnership or the Tanzanian government.44 
Fair Trade Social Enterprises (“FTSEs”): FTSEs buy 
their inputs (such as coffee beans) from small producers in 
developing countries.45 The subsidies to FTSEs flow 
primarily from their consumers who are willing to pay a 
 
40 TRIODOS BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2015, supra note 38, at 39. 
41 See generally ASHISH KARAMCHANDANI ET AL., EMERGING MARKETS, 
EMERGING MODELS: MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS TO THE CHALLENGES OF 
GLOBAL POVERTY (2009), http://www.beyondthepioneer.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/emergingmarkets_full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6FDG-KS3T]; C. K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE 
BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID: ERADICATING POVERTY THROUGH PROFITS 
(2010). 
42 See WINIFRED KARUGU & TRIZA MWENDWA, A TO Z TEXTILE MILLS: A 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROVIDING LONG-LASTING ANTI-MALARIA BED 
NETS TO THE POOR 2 (2007), 
http://healthmarketinnovations.org/sites/default/files/A%20To%20Z%20Te
xtiles%20Case%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/F88L-SHGJ]. 
43 Id. at 9–10. 
44 Id. at 11. 
45 See generally ALEX NICHOLLS & CHARLOTTE OPAL, FAIR TRADE: 
MARKET-DRIVEN ETHICAL CONSUMPTION (2005). 
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premium on fair trade products.46 Sales of fair trade products 
have increased dramatically in the last twenty years.47 Large 
corporations, such as Starbucks and Nestle, sell fair trade 
products. There are also many firms that only sell fair trade 
products, such as Cafédirect, a prominent hot drinks 
company in the UK. Cafédirect products are certified by 
Fairtrade International (“FLO”).48 The Fair Trade mark is 
attached to products that comply with the Fair Trade 
standards to signal to consumers that they deserve a 
premium over other products.49 The Fair Trade standards 
certify, inter alia, that the producers are “small producers,” 
broadly defined as those who produce labor-intensive 
products but employ a limited number of permanent workers 
 
46 DANIELE GIOVANNUCCI & FREEK JAN KOEKOEK, THE STATE OF 
SUSTAINABLE COFFEE: A STUDY OF TWELVE MAJOR MARKETS 40 (2003), 
http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=579 
[https://perma.cc/VQ27-KL9H]. 
47  See Rebecca Smithers, Global Fairtrade Sales Reach £4.4bn 
Following 15% Growth During 2013, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2014, 11:23 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/sep/03/global-fair-
trade-sales-reach-4-billion-following-15-per-cent-growth-2013 
[https://perma.cc/XZE9-R3MP]; Press Release, Research Reveals Increased 
Consumer Demand for Fair Trade Certified-Labeled Products, Fair Trade 
USA (Apr. 25, 2011), https://fairtradeusa.org/press-
room/press_release/research-reveals-increased-consumer-demand-fair-
trade-certified-labeled-pro [https://perma.cc/2KP5-7ADV]; cf. Sarah Butler, 
Fairtrade Sales Fall for First Time in Foundation’s 20-Year Existence, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2015, 7:01 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/23/fairtrade-sales-fall-
first-time-20-year-existence [https://perma.cc/6TLM-JFA6]. 
48  See Cafédirect: A Fairtrade Pioneer, FAIRTRADE INT’L (June 20, 
2011), https://www.fairtrade.net/new/latest-news/single-
view/article/cafedirect-a-fairtrade-pioneer.html [https://perma.cc/4AK6-
NDF2]. Note though that Fair Trade standards do not exist for all 
products, including many types of fruits and handicrafts. See Standards 
for Small Producer Organizations, FAIRTRADE INT’L (2014), 
https://www.fairtrade.net/standards/our-standards/small-producer-
standards.html [https://perma.cc/C87H-RE5K]. 
49 Certification for products rather than firms enables the same firm 
to have and operate both a social enterprise and a profit-maximizing 
enterprise (e.g., Starbucks selling fair trade products). 
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or rely on family labor.50 Moreover, FLO ensures (through 
audits and inspections) that the importer pays producers the 
Fair Trade minimum price, provides them with a “social 
premium” that must be used for developing their community, 
and, when requested, extends them pre-financing of up to 
60% of the orders.51 
Though many FTSEs rely exclusively on subsidies from 
consumers, shareholders appear to provide Cafédirect’s 
subsidy by accepting below-market returns.52 Cafédirect 
seems to use such subsidies to pay a higher price and a 
higher social premium than that mandated by the Fair 
Trade standards.53 The shares of Cafédirect are publicly 
listed and traded on a matched bargain exchange.54 While 
shareholders do have voting rights, there is also a guardian 
share, which is held by a subsidiary of Oxfam and a 
cooperative of producers that transact with the firm.55 The 
guardian share has the right to block any changes to the 
company’s objectives to sell exclusively fair trade products 
and reinvest a third of the profits in growers’ communities.56 
 
50 FAIRTRADE INT’L, FAIRTRADE STANDARD FOR SMALL PRODUCER 
ORGANIZATIONS § 1.2 (2011), https://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin 
/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/generic-standards/ 
SPO_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMU6-TFME]. 
51 Id. § 4.1; FAIRTRADE INT’L, FAIRTRADE STANDARD FOR COFFEE FOR 
SMALL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS §§ 4.2–4.3 (2011), 
https://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/d
ocuments/2012-04-01_EN_SPO_Coffee.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPY6-EB2V]. 
52 CAFÉDIRECT, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT (2015), 
http://www.cafedirect.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2015/05/FINAL-Annual-Review-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FXD8-BUNU] (“Cafédirect has built over the years a big 
pool of friends who have continued to support the business despite 
declining sales. Shareholders have really been very understanding given 
that no dividends have been declared in successive years.”). 
53 Id. at 3. 
54 Id. at 10. 
55 Id., at 28. 
56 Id. 
ELDAR – FINAL   
114 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
Work Integration Social Enterprises (“WISEs”): 
WISEs are businesses that employ disadvantaged workers 
who suffer from systemic unemployment. Disadvantaged 
employees include disabled people, ethnic minorities, 
individuals with a criminal record, and members of low-
income communities.57 WISEs usually sell products or 
services that require a large number of low-skilled employees 
in industries such as food, catering, and custodial services.  
A notable example is the Greyston Bakery, a growing 
business that specializes in gourmet brownies and baked ice 
cream ingredients. The Greyston Bakery hires workers in a 
low-income area in Yonkers, New York who have little or no 
education or employment records.58 Unlike other WISEs that 
pay fair market wages to their worker-beneficiaries, the 
bakery pays its workers a salary that reflects their average 
productivity without a wage premium. 
The Greyston Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to 
promoting community development primarily through 
employment programs, owns the bakery.59 The bakery has 
received subsidies from various sources. The foundation 
provided capital to the bakery presumably using donative 
funds. The foundation also provides training, housing 
assistance, and childcare services to the workers (among 
 
57 JERR BOSCHEE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE SOURCE BOOK (2001), 
http://www.socialent.org/pdfs/GREYSTONBAKERY.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5B4V-2R27]; Catherine Davister et al., Work Integration 
Social Enterprises in the European Union: An Overview of Existing Models 
11–12 (EMES Working Paper No. 04/04, 2004), 
http://emes.net/publication-categories/working-papers/ 
[https://perma.cc/WWS2-EDWB]. 
58 BOSCHEE, supra note 57, at 78–83; Michael Barker et al., A Case 
Study on Greyston Bakery: The Do-Goodie Product Launch 2 (May 15, 
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 
Barker et al., The Do-Goodie Product]; Michael Barker et al., Greyston 
Bakery: The Costs and Benefits of an Open Hiring Policy 1 (May 15, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Barker et 
al., Open Hiring Policy]. 
59 See Barker et al., The Do-Goodie Product, supra note 58, at 3. 
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others).60 Moreover, the bakery has been receiving favorable 
trade terms from its well-known customer, the ice cream 
company Ben & Jerry’s, including a willingness to adjust the 
terms of transactions if performance is not adequate or 
timely.61 The bakery also markets its social mission to attract 
premiums from consumers.62 
2. The Structure of For-Profit Social Enterprises 
For-profit social enterprises are not solely characterized 
by having a transactional relationship with a class of 
beneficiaries—in addition, they all have some contractual 
relationship with a nonprofit entity. Each of the social 
enterprises described above is either controlled or certified 
by a nonprofit or has a contract with one. This Article uses 
the term “nonprofit entity” loosely to include not only 
nonprofit corporations, but also government agencies and 
multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank. All 
these entities are effectively subject to a constraint on 
distribution, i.e., those who control the organization cannot 
distribute earnings to themselves. Social entrepreneurs, i.e., 
individuals with a strong reputation for pursuing altruistic 
missions who may also be viewed as being subject to some 
constraint on distribution,63 are also included in this 
definition of nonprofit entity. 
The role of the nonprofit is essentially to ensure that the 
for-profit social enterprise transacts with its beneficiaries as 
patrons, and in some cases also allocates a subsidy to them. 
There are essentially three mechanisms by which the 
nonprofit monitors the for-profit entity: (1) Certification 
mechanisms: firms or products are certified as a form of 
social enterprise in accordance with certain standards. As 
 
60 BOSCHEE, supra note 57, at 83. 
61 Barker et al., The Do-Goodie Product, supra note 58, at 8. 
62 See id. at 1–2. 
63 Social entrepreneurs effectively pledge their reputation as a 
commitment not to pursue excessive profits at the expense of the interests 
of third-party beneficiaries. 
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discussed above, the products of FTSEs are certified by FLO, 
to ensure that the firm transacts with “small producers” and 
extends them favorable terms. Likewise, CDFIs are certified 
as financial institutions that serve low-income communities. 
(2) Contractual mechanisms: a contract between the 
social enterprise and a nonprofit can require the social 
enterprise to transact with disadvantaged individuals. As 
discussed above, A to Z entered into an agreement with 
certain nonprofits to sell affordable bed nets to low-income 
consumers. Likewise, CDFIs enter into an assistance 
agreement with the CDFI Fund that dictates the terms 
extended by CDFIs to their consumers (e.g., discounted 
interest rates). (3) Control mechanisms: the for-profit is 
controlled, through ownership or voting rights, by a 
nonprofit that ensures that the for-profit transacts with a 
disadvantaged group. This mechanism is used by many 
forms of social enterprise, including MFIs such as 
Compartamos, social investment firms such as Triodos Bank, 
WISEs such as the Greyston Bakery, and even FTSEs such 
as Cafédirect. 
Each of these mechanisms essentially serves as a 
commitment device to subsidy providers—whether 
government, consumers or investors—ensuring that their 
subsidy is being used for its intended purpose. As explained 
in greater detail below, transactions with disadvantaged 
patrons are costly and require a subsidy. In the case of for-
profit social enterprises, there is a clear risk that the subsidy 
they receive will be distributed to the firm’s owners or 
misused by the managers. Thus, for-profit social enterprises 
must adopt one or more commitment devices to assure 
subsidy providers that the subsidy will not be expropriated. 
Section V explores the choice of commitment device in 
greater detail. For present purposes, the following analysis 
assumes that social enterprises are subject to some 
commitment device that ensures that they transact with a 
class of disadvantaged patrons. 
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3. Social Enterprises as Commercial Nonprofits 
Social enterprises (as hybrid organizations) may be—and 
many are—formed as nonprofits. Nonprofit social enterprises 
fall under the definition of commercial nonprofits, which 
receive a substantial part of their income from selling 
products or services.64 They are also hybrid organizations as 
they all receive some form of subsidy, whether from income 
tax exemptions or donations. In this case there is only one 
entity, the nonprofit social enterprise. For nonprofit social 
enterprises, the commitment device is simply the non-
distribution constraint and the nonprofit form. Those who 
control the organization have limited incentives to 
compromise the mission of the organization, which is to 
transact with disadvantaged individuals.65 There are many 
examples of nonprofit social enterprises. Some of the largest 
and most influential MFIs are nonprofits, including BRAC 
and ASA in Bangladesh. Community loan funds, a form of 
CDFI that focuses on loans to nonprofits and small 
businesses, are typically nonprofits.66 The Acumen Fund is a 
nonprofit venture fund that makes investments in 
businesses in developing countries that promote social goods, 
 
64 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 840–41. This raises the question 
whether many other commercial nonprofits, such as nursing homes and 
hospitals, should be viewed as social enterprises, especially those that do 
not engage in development missions. The answer turns on whether or not 
such organizations facilitate transactions with individuals that cannot 
transact with commercial firms. For example, nursing homes and day care 
centers that provide high quality services to affluent customers would not 
count as social enterprises. However, hospitals and universities that 
provide affordable services to low-income individuals would count. 
65 The function of the non-distribution constraint was laid out in id., 
at 838. In addition, for a commercial firm, such as a bank or a bakery, to 
qualify as a tax-exempt organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), it must serve 
a charitable purpose, presumably by transacting with disadvantaged or 
poor individuals. 
66 CDFI COALITION, supra note 31. 
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such as A to Z discussed above.67 VisionSpring, a low-cost 
manufacturer and seller of affordable reading glasses,68 and 
Aravind Eye Care System, a provider of low-cost eye care 
services,69 are nonprofits. 
B. Social Enterprises Versus Donative Organizations 
Social enterprises need to be distinguished from donative 
organizations. Donative organizations have been defined as 
nonprofits that are funded primarily by donations.70 Oxfam 
International, a nonprofit devoted to promoting development 
and alleviating poverty, is a well-known example. This 
Article uses the term “donative organization” to refer not 
only to certain nonprofit corporations but also to government 
agencies and multilateral organizations that allocate 
subsidies to promote development. These organizations may 
be viewed as nonprofits because they are effectively subject 
to a non-distribution constraint; those who control the 
organization are prohibited from appropriating its funds for 
themselves. Moreover, they are essentially dependent on a 
form of grant, i.e., an allocation of governmental funds. 
USAID and the World Bank are two common examples of 
such organizations. 
There are two main elements that distinguish between 
social enterprises and donative organizations. The first is 
that the former are funded by earned income, whereas the 
latter are funded by donations. As discussed above, social 
enterprises, as subsidized commercial enterprises, may 
receive donations or grants. The critical point, however, is 
that the financial viability of social enterprises is primarily 
 
67 See ACUMEN, http://acumen.org/ [https://perma.cc/L732-PDKM] (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
68 See VISIONSPRING, http://visionspring.org/ [https://perma.cc/7RW3-
JCVB] (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
69 See About Us, ARAVIND EYE CARE SYSTEM, 
http://www.aravind.org/Default/aboutuscontent/genesis 
[https://perma.cc/373T-WAGQ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
70 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 840. 
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dependent on earned income rather than donations. The 
second often overlooked element, which is central to the 
theory in this Article, is that donative organizations are 
engaged primarily in allocating subsidies to “external” 
beneficiaries, i.e., beneficiaries who are not patrons of the 
enterprise.71 Examples of subsidies to external beneficiaries 
include distribution of goods (e.g., bed nets), subsidies 
towards the purchase of goods or services (e.g., voucher 
schemes or contribution of capital through credit subsidies), 
and professional training programs. To be sure, many social 
enterprises do allocate subsidies to their beneficiaries. MFIs 
may provide subsidized rates to their borrowers, and FTSEs 
may provide training subsidies to their farmers. However, 
whereas donative organizations are engaged exclusively in 
transferring subsidies to beneficiaries, social enterprises 
require their patron-beneficiaries to provide a nontrivial 
consideration (e.g., return of a loan with interest, or input 
provided by farmers) that reflects their capital and resources 
(e.g., ability to pay or productivity). 
Finally, it should be emphasized that joint ventures or 
other contractual arrangements between donative 
organizations and for-profits may effectively create social 
enterprises. In fact, these arrangements may underlie the 
contractual and control mechanisms discussed above. First, a 
donative organization may enter into a contract with a for-
profit firm pursuant to which the former provides subsidies 
and the latter commits to transacting with certain 
beneficiaries. The for-profit essentially becomes a social 
enterprise because of this contract. The agreement discussed 
above between A to Z, a for-profit seller of bed nets, and a 
partnership consisting of donative organizations is one 
 
71 See infra Figure 2. Donative organizations may have a contract 
with their beneficiaries that requires them to use subsidies for their 
intended purpose (e.g., using medical supplies to treat patients). But, the 
critical point is that the beneficiaries are not required to provide a 
nontrivial consideration for the benefit received. 
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example.72 Similarly, donative organizations often agree to 
provide training subsidies and quality control to farmers in 
developing countries if a for-profit firm—essentially an 
FTSE—contractually commits to buying its supplies from 
those producers.73 
Second, control mechanisms often include a donative 
organization that provides subsidized equity investment to 
the social enterprise entity. One example is the Greyston 
Foundation, the owner of the Greyston bakery. Its regular 
activities concentrate on providing professional training to 
external beneficiaries, i.e., the unemployed, but with respect 
to the bakery, it operates like a social investment firm.74 
 
 
72 See supra text accompanying notes 41–44. 
73 See Aneel Karnani, Reducing Poverty through Employment, 
INNOVATIONS, Spring 2011, at 73, 82–86 (describing a partnership 
between Technoserve and entrepreneurs to establish cashew nut plants in 
Mozambique). 
74 For instance, the bakery is the patron-beneficiary. See supra note 
62 and accompanying text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: DONATIVE ORGANIZATION 
Donors/ 
Government Beneficiaries 
Donative 
Organization 
A donative organization is funded by subsidies in the form of donations 
or grants, and it distributes those subsidies to its beneficiaries. A one-
sided light grey arrow is used to denote a subsidy.  
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C. Social Enterprises Versus Other Hybrid 
Organizations 
As stated above, a common form of hybrid organization 
consists of corporations that engage in corporate charity and 
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”). The major difference 
between these organizations and social enterprises is that 
they do not involve a commitment to transacting with 
beneficiaries. In most cases, like donative organizations, 
CSR policies involve the transfer of a subsidy to an external 
beneficiary.75 Many corporations donate a portion of their 
profits to charity. Often such donations are made to a 
donative organization (for example, the Global Fund) that 
channels them to external beneficiaries (e.g., people with 
HIV in developing countries). CSR policies are largely 
identical to corporate charity in economic terms, except that 
CSR usually refers to a wider range of methods for passing 
on subsidies. Google has vowed to use one percent of its 
profits and its employees’ time to create solutions to global 
problems, such as climate change and poverty alleviation.76 
 
TABLE 1: GIVING VERSUS TRANSACTING 
 Giving Transacting 
For-profit Corporate Charity For-profit Social 
Enterprise 
Nonprofit Donative 
Organizations 
Nonprofit Social 
Enterprise 
 
 
 
75 More difficult cases of CSR, where the subsidy is channeled to a 
patron but there is no “true patron-beneficiary,” are discussed infra 
Section VI.A. 
76 See Reiser, supra note 10, at 2439. 
ELDAR – FINAL   
122 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
Accordingly, the key distinction drawn in this paper is 
between organizations that provide charity through giving 
subsidies and social enterprises that commit to transacting 
with disadvantaged groups. The distinction between giving 
and transacting transcends the traditional distinction 
between for-profits and nonprofits. As shown in Table 1, 
“giving” organizations include both donative organizations 
and for-profit corporations that engage in charity, and as 
shown above, social enterprises may be formed as for-profit 
or nonprofits. The focus of this Article is to highlight the 
advantages of social enterprises in utilizing subsidies to 
promote development, although other forms of hybrid 
organizations are discussed in more detail in Section VI. 
Finally, not all firms fit neatly into a specific category. 
Many social enterprises adopt corporate social responsibility 
initiatives. Similarly, a donative organization may comprise 
a social enterprise.77 Accordingly, the categories identified 
herein should be considered as ideal types rather than 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. 
III. A THEORY OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
The theory of social enterprise set out here explains how 
the transactions with their patron-beneficiaries make social 
enterprises relatively effective in addressing complex 
development missions as compared to other forms of 
organization. For this purpose, there is no need to draw 
distinctions between social enterprises formed as for-profits 
and those formed as nonprofits, as long as they are under a 
commitment to transact with a class of disadvantaged 
patrons. This Section will first consider the problems posed 
by the use of subsidies and then will explain how the 
measurement function of social enterprises can mitigate 
these problems. 
 
77 For example, donative organizations that operate training 
programs may also employ disadvantaged workers. 
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A. The Limits of Subsidies 
Standard economic theory is suspicious of subsidizing 
corporations. There is a general concern that subsidies fail to 
achieve their purpose and may be expropriated by those who 
control the organization. In the case of donative 
organizations, the non-distribution constraint mitigates the 
possibility that managers will expropriate the subsidies (i.e., 
the donations). The non-distribution constraint on its own is 
a relatively crude mechanism that works well especially 
when donative organizations simply transfer subsidies to 
beneficiaries (e.g., soup kitchens). However, in many cases, 
the goal of subsidies is to address complex development 
missions, such as increasing access to capital and improving 
employment opportunities. It is unrealistic to expect the non-
distribution constraint to assure donors that their subsidies 
will be used effectively when the mission is highly complex. 
While there may be many reasons why subsidies fail, 
their ineffectiveness generally stems from information 
asymmetries. Subsidies are transactions in which the 
provider of the subsidy gives something of value (cash, goods 
or a service) to a recipient, but may be unable to evaluate 
how that subsidy was used at the time that the subsidy was 
given. If a donor gives $100 to fund a training program for 
low-income workers, there may be uncertainty as to whether 
the training subsidy was effective in increasing employment. 
Whether the training is effective depends on the attributes of 
each beneficiary. The beneficiaries may already be 
productive, and their unemployment is possibly due to other 
economic factors. Alternatively, workers may lack very basic 
skills (e.g., attentiveness), and therefore complicated 
technical training may be inappropriate. An ineffective 
subsidy is not simply a distribution of wealth but constitutes 
waste, as the provider of the subsidy presumably intended it 
to be utilized effectively. 
Social enterprises are designed to deal with the 
uncertainty of subsidies’ effectiveness when subsidies are 
intended to address complex development missions, such as 
increasing access to capital and enhancing productivity. 
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Employing subsidies effectively to address such problems 
requires differentiating among beneficiaries based on their 
attributes, including creditworthiness, productivity, and 
ability to pay. Such complex problems merit specific 
attention. Consider a worker from a disadvantaged 
community that suffers from systemic unemployment. 
Rephrasing the issue, the problem is that such a worker 
cannot find employment at a standard commercial firm. 
Likewise, poor individuals cannot get loans from commercial 
banks, small producers have difficulty selling their products 
to multinational corporations, and individuals in rural 
communities cannot buy essential products and services. 
This inability of disadvantaged people to transact with 
commercial firms may derive from two sources. The first is 
that commercial firms have difficulty evaluating the abilities 
of individuals that belong to disadvantaged groups. As a 
result of such information asymmetries, commercial firms 
fail to transact with them, even if such individuals have fully 
competitive (“FC”) abilities to carry out their transactions 
with the firm. A substantial body of research shows that 
although many members of disadvantaged communities may 
be too poor or lack technical skills, a significant number of 
them have sufficient capabilities to transact with commercial 
firms, for example, by buying products, repaying debt, or 
working at a factory.78 While any commercial firm has to 
deal with information asymmetries with respect to the 
attributes of its patrons, e.g., workers’ skills or borrowers’ 
creditworthiness, there are various mechanisms to mitigate 
these problems. For example, education helps workers signal 
their abilities, and credit-rating bureaus collect information 
on borrowers’ creditworthiness. Such mechanisms are often 
absent in developing countries or low-income communities. 
Moreover, the high proportion of individuals who lack FC 
abilities in disadvantaged communities makes it harder for 
commercial firms to identify those who have such abilities. 
Consequently, when transacting with disadvantaged 
 
78 See infra Part IV. 
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individuals, firms may face a higher risk of transacting with 
individuals with less than FC abilities.79 Transacting with 
disadvantaged patrons therefore entails opportunity costs 
(reflecting the opportunity to transact with patrons with 
higher abilities), and hence leads commercial firms to ignore 
them altogether. 
Second, many disadvantaged individuals fall short of FC 
abilities. Commercial firms would not transact with them 
even if they could observe their abilities. The traditional 
approach to dealing with this problem is for a donative 
organization, a government agency, or a nonprofit to provide 
them with some form of assistance—essentially a subsidy. 
Such assistance may take several forms, for example, 
distribution or subsidization of goods, credit subsidies, or 
professional training programs. However, for such a subsidy 
to be effective there must be information on the abilities of 
its beneficiaries. An effective subsidy would only be allocated 
to those who have below-competitive (“BC”) abilities, but who 
could reach FC abilities if they received the subsidy. A 
subsidy would be of limited effectiveness if it were allocated 
to people who already have FC abilities or to individuals who 
have no competitive (“NC”) abilities, i.e., individuals who are 
unable to acquire FC abilities even if they received 
assistance.80 For example, a training subsidy should be 
administered only to workers who have some basic skills and 
 
79 In general, firms can adjust their contracts to reflect the lower 
abilities of disadvantaged patrons, for example, by reducing wages or 
increasing interest rates to borrowers. But as wages fall or interest rates 
increase, more capable patron-beneficiaries will exit the market, a process 
that leads to rationing and often a collapse of the market. See Joseph E. 
Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1981); see also ARMENDÁRIZ & 
MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 29–56. 
80 Of course, this categorization is somewhat crude, but it is 
nonetheless helpful in elucidating the advantages of social enterprises. 
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could perform at a fully competitive level if they received 
professional training.81 
The problem with donative organizations, however, is 
that they have limited means for gathering information on 
their beneficiaries’ attributes. By definition, there is no 
transactional relationship between the organization and the 
beneficiaries.82 A contractual transaction enables commercial 
enterprises to elicit information about their patrons, 
especially their abilities and preferences. It shows that 
patrons have at least some capabilities to perform the 
contract. For example, repayment of a debt or performance 
as an employee reveals information on one’s abilities. By 
contrast, because donative organizations do not transact 
with their beneficiaries, they lack this information.83 
If donative organizations had information on 
beneficiaries’ attributes, they would be able to allocate the 
appropriate amount and type of subsidy. But, without such 
information, there is a risk that they will prescribe wasteful 
programs with limited effect84 that do not address the needs 
 
81 To be sure, charitable transfers (e.g., cash or food stamps) to those 
with NC abilities is desirable; the point is that at a very low ability level, 
professional training would be a wasteful way of allocating subsidies to 
such individuals. 
82 See supra Figure 2. 
83 Donative organizations could conduct impact studies of their 
programs to address this problem. However, these studies are often 
prohibitively costly. For example, following every worker that undergoes a 
training program to record employment and performance requires paying 
numerous staffers to both gather and interpret the information. Moreover, 
it has been argued that donative organizations have only modest 
incentives to carry out such studies because they may highlight to donors 
the ineffectiveness of the organization’s programs. See Bertin Martens, 
The Role of Evaluation in Foreign Aid Programmes, in THE INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS OF FOREIGN AID 154, 170 (Bertin Martens et al. eds., 2002). 
84 There is ample literature on the disappointing effectiveness of aid 
provided by government agencies or international organizations. See id., 
at 155; William Easterly, Can the West Save Africa?, 47 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 373, 438–39 (2009); William Easterly, Was Development 
Assistance a Mistake?, 97 AM. ECON. REV., 328, 330 (2007); Claudia R. 
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and attributes of their beneficiaries. The waste in this case 
includes the costs of the subsidy (e.g., the cost of the 
training) given to those with FC abilities (as they do not 
need any training) and to those with NC abilities (for whom 
training would be useless).85 The additional social costs 
include the waste from training those with BC abilities 
effectively who nonetheless fail to obtain employment with 
firms that choose to ignore disadvantaged individuals 
anyway. Accordingly, subsidies tend to be wasteful when 
there is a high proportion of individuals with FC or NC 
abilities or if commercial firms ignore disadvantaged groups 
anyway. 
B. The Measurement Role of Social Enterprises 
The thrust of the theory described in this Article is that 
transacting with their beneficiaries gives social enterprises 
the tools and incentives to utilize subsidies effectively. Social 
enterprises perform a measurement function with respect to 
the attributes of their beneficiaries. Unlike donative 
organizations, social enterprises are committed to 
transacting with their beneficiaries as patrons.86 The 
commitment device ensures that they cannot transact with 
other more capable patrons, for example, more productive 
workers from high-income communities.87 Because 
transacting with disadvantaged patrons entails opportunity 
costs, social enterprises must receive some subsidies. 
 
Williamson, Exploring the Failure of Foreign Aid: The Role of Incentives 
and Information, 23 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 17, 27–31 (2010). 
85 Without information, the rational strategy is to provide the same 
subsidy to all beneficiaries in the same amount that would help those who 
have BC abilities attain FC abilities. The reason is that disbursals in any 
other amount and type will always be inefficient, whereas such disbursals 
may at least be efficient with respect to beneficiaries that have BC 
abilities. 
86 Compare supra Figure 1 with supra Figure 2. 
87 The form of commitment device adopted by the social enterprise is 
of limited relevance for present purposes. For a discussion of choice of 
commitment devices and organizational form, see infra Part V. 
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However, as explained above, social enterprises must still 
earn revenues to remain financially viable.88 For social 
enterprises to earn revenues, the patron-beneficiaries must 
be able to perform their tasks and duties under their 
transactions with the social enterprise firm at a reasonable 
level: a WISE would suffer financially if its workers were not 
competent; an MFI must ensure that its borrowers are 
sufficiently creditworthy; if the quality of input is low, 
FTSEs will not be able to sell their products; and for a low-
cost seller to be commercially viable, its consumers must be 
able to purchase the products or services it offers. 
Consequently, social enterprises have the tools and the 
incentives to measure their beneficiaries’ abilities to make 
sure that they have at least FC or BC abilities.89 For 
example, as discussed below, WISEs closely evaluate the 
productivity and performance of their worker-beneficiaries. 
Social enterprises use the information on their patron-
beneficiaries to tailor the amount and type of subsidies to 
their specific needs. If the subsidies transferred to 
beneficiaries are excessive, the social enterprise will be less 
profitable. If the subsidy is insufficient or inadequate, the 
patron-beneficiaries may not perform well, and again the 
business will suffer. For example, a WISE will employ those 
with FC abilities, but has no need to allocate them a training 
subsidy. It will then allocate a subsidy only to those who 
have BC abilities. In particular, given its contractual 
 
88 An example is a social enterprise that employs disadvantaged 
workers and makes a 10% annual return on a $1 million investment, while 
a profit-maximizing firm would make a 30% annual return on the same 
investment; the subsidy is the 20% annual return that investors are 
willing to forgo. It is noteworthy that a social enterprise may also make 
negative returns on invested capital as long as it also receives additional 
subsidies to ensure that the firm remains solvent—for example, where the 
return on investment is -10% and the firm receives a government grant to 
cover accounting losses. Even in this case, the firm needs to earn 
substantial revenues to be viable. 
89 Depending on the business model, some social enterprises transact 
only with individuals who have FC abilities, whereas others transact also 
with those who have BC abilities. 
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relationship with its worker-beneficiaries, a WISE is able to 
ensure that workers with BC abilities are actually 
productive and that the training program is indeed adapted 
to the commercial needs of the firm.90 Note also that there 
are welfare gains to patron-beneficiaries with FC or BC 
abilities who would not otherwise be able to transact with 
commercial firms.91 Contrast this with a donative 
organization that allocates wasteful subsidies to 
beneficiaries with FC and NC abilities, and has no practical 
way to ensure that its beneficiaries are actually employed. 
Accordingly, the use of social enterprises results in more 
effective deployment of subsidies. 
In this way, the commitment to transacting with a 
disadvantaged group effectively aligns the profit and social 
missions of social enterprises.92 More specifically, it aligns 
the interests of the subsidy providers with the profit interest 
of those who control the social enterprise, i.e., the owners in 
the case of for-profit social enterprises93 or the managers in 
the case of nonprofit social enterprises who presumably want 
to maximize spending on perquisites.94 In order for social 
 
90 A social enterprise will sever its transactions with those who have 
NC abilities as they are unable to perform the job, but these individuals 
may still seek relief from a donative organization. See J.P. MORGAN GLOB. 
RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., supra note 3, at 45 (noting that a 
portion of the population with the lowest income levels will remain reliant 
on aid). 
91 These welfare gains are equal to the economic surplus they derive 
from their transactional relationship with the social enterprise. 
92 Note that this is subject to the risk of mission-drift discussed infra 
Section VII.A. 
93 When a for-profit social enterprise adopts a control mechanism as a 
commitment device, the owners may be nonprofits that provide subsidies 
to the social enterprise. Nonetheless, even such nonprofit owners have a 
profit motive to increase their income, so that they have more funds to 
apply towards their social missions. 
94 In line with the model of nonprofits offered by Glaeser & Shleifer, 
supra note 19, managers of nonprofits want to increase profits because 
they can extract a proportion of such profits in the form of higher salaries 
and perks. 
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enterprises (for-profits or nonprofits) to remain financially 
viable, they must ensure that their patron-beneficiaries 
perform well and that subsidies are not wasted. Thus, the 
incentives of social enterprises to allocate subsidies 
effectively are present even if, and in fact in large part 
because, the owners and/or managers are motivated by 
profit. The same incentives exist when the owners and/or 
managers are altruistic, because even an altruistic owner or 
manager does not derive utility from wasting subsidies and 
must make sure that the business is viable for it to achieve 
its development mission. 
Social enterprises employ three primary mechanisms to 
measure their beneficiaries’ attributes: (1) Due diligence: 
Social enterprises study the attributes of their beneficiaries 
before entering into a contract with them in order to decide 
whether or not to transact. (2) Intensive monitoring: In 
the course of transacting with the beneficiaries, the social 
enterprise monitors their performance, thereby acquiring 
information on their abilities. This information is used to 
make two decisions: whether to continue the contractual 
relationship and what type of subsidies should be allocated 
to the beneficiaries. (3) Incentive mechanisms: Social 
enterprises may utilize the relationship with the patron-
beneficiaries as the basis for developing incentive 
mechanisms to reveal information on patron-beneficiaries’ 
abilities and efforts. To be eligible for a subsidy, beneficiaries 
with BC abilities must reveal their abilities to perform the 
contract; if they were to represent themselves as having NC 
abilities, they would not be able to transact with the social 
enterprise. While those with FC abilities may have an 
incentive to pretend they have BC abilities so that they may 
qualify for certain subsidies (e.g., longer grace periods on 
loans), the contract may provide for various mechanisms to 
mitigate their incentives to understate their abilities (e.g., a 
promise of a future loan on better terms if they timely repay 
a loan, thereby revealing their FC abilities). 
To be sure, these mechanisms are not conceptually 
different from those used in contracts between standard 
commercial firms and their patrons. The main difference is 
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that employing these mechanisms with respect to 
disadvantaged persons is more costly than with respect to 
non-disadvantaged ones and may require social enterprises 
to develop specialized techniques to measure the attributes 
of disadvantaged individuals; hence, the need for a subsidy. 
For example, doing diligence in rural markets on the 
creditworthiness or ability to pay of low-income people may 
be extremely costly; intensive monitoring of workers with 
different ability levels requires a great deal of effort on the 
part of managers. Additionally, as shown below, incentive 
mechanisms used by social enterprises can be highly 
specialized and entail high transaction costs. 
It follows that the primary role of subsidies is not to fund 
direct allocations to beneficiaries via discounted prices or 
rates. As shown above, many social enterprises do not make 
any such allocation. Compartamos, for example, may be 
viewed as transacting exclusively with poor borrowers who 
have high, presumably FC abilities, charging them rates that 
reflect their creditworthiness. The primary role of the 
subsidies is to fund the costs associated with transacting 
with patron-beneficiaries, especially the costs of measuring 
or evaluating beneficiaries’ attributes. In this respect, social 
enterprises also have incentives to economize on the costs of 
measurement by employing a variety of creative 
mechanisms. As shown below, many social enterprises have 
developed efficient mechanisms for measuring their patron-
beneficiaries’ attributes through diligence, monitoring, and 
incentive mechanisms. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that social 
enterprises only have efficiency advantages over donative 
organizations when there are information asymmetries with 
respect to beneficiaries’ attributes. When there are no 
information asymmetries, a donative organization is equally 
effective in allocating subsidies. The most conspicuous 
example is distribution of food aid in the midst of a natural 
crisis, such as an earthquake. There is relatively little risk 
that such aid will be employed ineffectively. Likewise, if 
there is available information on beneficiaries’ abilities to 
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pay or skill level, donative organizations could simply tailor 
subsidies to their needs. 
The measurement role of social enterprise is thus 
essential only when it is necessary to differentiate among 
beneficiaries. Evaluating the abilities of different types of 
beneficiaries is critical in the context of development goals, 
such as enhancing access to capital or increasing 
productivity. Allocating subsidies to facilitate development 
requires screening creditworthy borrowers from risky ones, 
differentiating between productive workers and those who 
lack basic skills, and evaluating the ability of consumers to 
pay for products and services. Social enterprises have the 
ability and incentives to gather this information and, as a 
result, are likely to use subsidies effectively. 
 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE THEORY 
This Section applies the theory to various forms of social 
enterprise. The discussion is divided into different types of 
development goals. With respect to such goals, this Section 
describes how information problems preclude standard 
commercial firms from transacting with disadvantaged 
groups, explains why donative organizations fail to assist 
them, and shows how social enterprises use their 
measurement role to address the problem. 
A. Access to Capital: Microfinance Institutions, Credit 
Development Financial Institutions and Social 
Investment Firms 
(1) Commercial Firms: Commercial banks have 
traditionally avoided transacting with poor individuals in 
low-income communities in both developing and developed 
countries. Commercial lenders rely on credit scores to 
evaluate their borrowers. They also require collateral or 
other security to mitigate the risk of default. In low-income 
communities, credit scores are usually not available, as 
borrowers lack credit history, employment track record, and, 
in some cases, even proof of identity. In addition, poor 
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borrowers usually lack collateral to pledge as security for a 
loan.95 Moreover, the presence of many risky borrowers who 
have limited earning capacity makes it harder for banks to 
identify those who can repay their debts. Likewise, 
investment firms tend to ignore small businesses, especially 
in developing countries.96 In developed markets, investment 
firms, such as private equity firms, rely on audited financial 
information, the track record and reputation of their 
investees’ management, and general market information. By 
contrast, in developing markets, the balance sheet of 
businesses may not be a reliable source of information, as 
financial standards either do not exist or are not enforced, 
and, more generally, data on the relevant market may be 
scarce. Moreover, evaluating the potential of a small 
business with no track record can be difficult. 
(2) Donative Organizations: Many low-income 
individuals or small businesses cannot pay commercial rates 
for loans or generate commercial returns. Governments of 
developing countries have for many years subsidized credit 
in an attempt to increase access to capital, especially for 
small farmers. These subsidies have taken different forms, in 
particular, the allocation of cheap loans through credit 
subsidies. However, credit subsidies in whatever form have 
been grossly inefficient.97 Repayment rates in such programs 
have been very low, with default rates ranging from forty to 
ninety-five percent.98 Impact studies have attributed low 
 
95 See CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY (Margaret J. Miller ed., 2003). 
96 See HELMS, supra note 16, at 2–5; PRAHALAD, supra note 41, at 32; 
Benjamin et al., supra note 31, at 177–79. 
97 ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 9–12; see generally 
UNDERMINING RURAL DEVELOPMENT WITH CHEAP CREDIT (Dale W. 
Adams et al. eds., 1984); Avishay Braverman & J. Luis Guasch, Rural 
Credit Markets and Institutions in Developing Countries: Lessons for 
Policy Analysis from Practice and Modern Theory, 14 WORLD DEV. 1253 
(1986); Juan J. Buttari, Subsidized Credit Programs: The Theory, the 
Record, the Alternatives (USAID Evaluation Special Study No. 75, 1995). 
98 ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
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repayment rates in large part to information problems. 
Examples include inadequate program design that wrongly 
assumed that borrowers, mainly farmers, necessarily had 
good projects, uncertainty regarding the ability of borrowers 
to meet payment obligations, and failures to monitor 
borrowers who often diverted loan funds to other purposes, 
including consumption.99 Moreover, many borrowers lacked 
knowledge and inputs, and therefore their projects were 
likely to fail. Accordingly, these subsidized programs were 
often wasteful and their costs swamped the modest benefits 
that they generated. 
(3) Social Enterprises: MFIs, CDFIs, and social 
investment firms tailor the terms of their investments to the 
creditworthiness and business potential of their investees. 
Compartamos charges market rates on its loans to the 
moderately poor. Thus, it does not directly allocate subsidies 
to its beneficiaries; rather, it utilizes the subsidies it has 
received to measure its beneficiaries’ creditworthiness. As a 
result of such measurement, default rates tend to be very 
low, despite the high interest rates charged to borrowers.100 
Simply transferring credit subsidies to borrowers in 
circumstances when they can afford to take out a commercial 
loan or, even worse, when they have no viable projects is 
clearly an inferior solution. On the other hand, MFIs, CDFIs 
and social investment firms that transact with less capable 
individuals provide them with different types of subsidies. 
For example, MFIs, such as ASA, BRAC and Grameen Bank, 
provide their borrowers with reduced rates and business 
training.101 Similarly, while some social investment funds 
 
99 See Braverman & Guasch, supra note 97, at 1257; Buttari, supra 
note 97. 
100 Default rates for Compartamos were historically less than 1%, 
whereas the average default rate on consumer loans by other Mexican 
banks was 4.4%. See COMPARTAMOS OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 26, at 
83. 
101 See ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 325–39; BRAC, 
2015 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2016), 
http://www.brac.net/images/reports/BRAC-Bangladesh-Report-2015.pdf 
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seek to make near-competitive returns,102 others, such as 
Triodos Bank and the Acumen Fund, charge below-market 
rates and provide business training to their investees.103 
Thus, the prices and subsidies are adjusted to the 
beneficiaries’ abilities. 
The effectiveness of subsidies channeled through social 
enterprises is evidenced by their self-sustainability. When 
borrowers of MFIs and CDFIs pay back their loans, and 
investees of social investment firms generate reasonable 
returns, this indicates that the subsidies are effective, as the 
patron-beneficiaries are performing well. In particular, 
measurement of borrowers has been particularly successful 
for MFIs whose loan repayment rates tend to be very high.104 
As discussed above, social enterprises use three primary 
mechanisms to measure their beneficiaries: 
(i) Due diligence: CDFIs use alternative mechanisms to 
collect information on the creditworthiness of low-income 
borrowers, such as utility bills, house visits, and personal 
interaction with borrowers.105 To reduce the costs of 
 
[https://perma.cc/CD53-2M27]; Ruhul Amin & Rashidul Islam Sheikh, The 
Impact of Micro-Finance Program on the Poor: A Comparative Study of 
Grameen Bank, BRAC and ASA in Some Selected Areas in Bangladesh, 3 
EUR. J. BUS. & MGMT. 346 (2011). Note that the rates charged by 
microfinance institutions are higher than average commercial rates 
because of the risk associated with lending to the poor; the key point 
however is that their lending rates are lower than those that commercial 
firms would require if they made loans to disadvantaged individuals. 
102 For example, the IGNIA Fund, discussed infra Section V.C. 
103 See MOSES LEE, ACUMEN FUND: HOW TO MAKE THE GREATEST 
IMPACT (2007), http://acumen.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/1428592-
acumen-fund-donotcopy.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8X5-X9JB]; TRIODOS BANK 
ANNUAL REPORT 2015, supra note 38. 
104 There is mixed data on delinquency rates of CDFIs’ loans, though 
they generally appear to be comparable to industry averages. See MICHAEL 
SWACK ET AL., CARSEY INSTITUTE, CDFI INDUSTRY ANALYSIS: SUMMARY 
REPORT (2012). 
105 Lindsey Appleyard, Community Development Finance Institution 
(CDFIs): Geographies of Financial Inclusion in the US and UK, 42 
GEOFORUM 250, 255 (2011); KATY JACOB, THE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. 
INNOVATION, REACHING DEEPER: USING ALTERNATIVE DATA SOURCES TO 
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information, they also tend to specialize in specific 
industries, such as housing finance.106 Social investment 
firms invest effort and resources in due diligence, including 
vetting the character and qualifications of the management 
team and financial analysis of their investees.107 By contrast, 
MFIs that make very small loans to borrowers tend to 
conduct a less onerous diligence process and rely more 
extensively on other mechanisms. 
(ii) Intensive monitoring: MFIs as well as CDFIs evaluate 
the performance of their borrowers for the duration of their 
loans, and over time they accumulate data on borrowers’ 
business projects and repayment rates. MFIs use frequent 
repayment installments of very small amounts in order to 
allow their credit officers an early opportunity to assess 
borrowers’ performance.108 Repayment of the loan on time is 
a clear indication of a borrower’s abilities, and she may then 
be given additional loans. At some stage, it may become 
evident that borrowers no longer need a subsidy. They then 
may obtain loans at commercial rates; for example, the 
interest rates may be lowered and the loan size increased, 
not as a disbursal to the borrower, but to reflect the lower 
risk of lending to a borrower with higher abilities. On the 
other hand, if borrowers default, they receive no additional 
 
INCREASE THE EFFICACY OF CREDIT SCORING, https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-
innovation-files/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/14031138/2006-03-Reaching-
Deeper-Using-Alternative-Data-Sources-to-Increase-the-Efficacy-of-Credit-
Scoring.pdf [https://perma.cc/X279-MK2P] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).  
106 See Ronald Grzywinski, The New Old-Fashioned Banking, HARV. 
BUS. REV., May–June 1991, at 87, 93; Michael Klausner, Market Failure 
and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the 
Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1578–79 (1995). 
107 See J.P. MORGAN GLOB. RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., 
supra note 3, at 70. For a useful illustration of the process, see WILLIAM 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE, ACUMEN FUND: VALUING A SOCIAL VENTURE (A) (2009); 
WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE, ACUMEN FUND: VALUING A SOCIAL VENTURE 
(B) (2009). 
108 See ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 145–53. 
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loans.109 Through this process, MFIs and CDFIs have 
compiled a sizeable database on the creditworthiness of their 
target markets. Although social investment firms tend to 
rely more on diligence, they also exercise substantial 
monitoring over their investees. The monitoring may consist 
of appointing directors to the board of the investee and 
requiring board consent for certain business decisions, 
including not only major transactions, such as mergers, but 
also managerial decisions regarding business strategy.110 
(iii) Incentive mechanisms: Many MFIs rely on a 
specialized incentive mechanism known as group lending. 
The gist of it is that loans are made to a group of borrowers 
who are jointly liable for the debts of each other borrower in 
the group.111 Group lending gives rise to a process of 
assortative matching whereby safe (risky) borrowers form 
groups with other safe (risky) borrowers. The risky 
borrowers are effectively charged higher rates than the safe 
ones because their groups default more often. In this way, 
group lending generates information on borrowers’ abilities 
before a loan is made. Group lending also reduces moral 
hazard ex post a loan contract, as group members monitor 
each other to make sure they repay their loans, and failure 
to pay results in social stigma.112 Group lending has been 
often associated with very high repayment rates of over 90%. 
Despite its apparent effectiveness, many MFIs are gradually 
shifting away from group lending to more standard 
mechanisms, mainly because conducting group meetings 
 
109 For example, South Shore Bank, a known CDFI, experimented 
with loans to small businesses that suffered from high default rates before 
it started focusing on housing finance. See Grzywinski, supra note 106, at 
93. 
110 See, e.g., WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE, ACUMEN FUND: VALUING A 
SOCIAL VENTURE (A), supra note 107, at 21 
–24. 
111 For a detailed explanation, see ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra 
note 16, at 97–98. 
112 Id. at 157. 
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involves high transaction and social costs.113 In particular, 
MFIs promise borrowers an opportunity to borrow more 
capital on better terms if they repay their existing loans on 
time.114 Thus, loans may be made for larger amounts, longer 
terms, and at better interest rates. This addresses the risk 
that borrowers will not pay once project returns have been 
realized. 
B. Improving Productivity: Fair Trade Social 
Enterprises 
(1) Commercial firms: Multinational corporations buy 
their inputs from well-established commercial producers or 
middlemen and avoid buying inputs directly from small 
producers.115 The major concern of commercial firms is the 
quality of products supplied by small producers. In a 
fragmented market of numerous suppliers, and with respect 
to products the quality of which is not observable by cursory 
inspection, it is too costly to evaluate each item of input. 
Coffee beans and bananas are two notable examples.116 
 
113 Nitin Bhatt & Shui-Yan Tang, The Problem of Transaction Costs in 
Group-Based Microlending: An Institutional Perspective, 26 WORLD DEV. 
623 (1998). 
114 ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 140, 143. 
115 Small producers sell their products to middlemen known as 
“coyotes” who are often in a position to exploit their monopsonist power. 
Thus, a common explanation for fair trade is that it is a solution to 
monopsonist pricing. See NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 45, at 33–34; Mark 
Hayes, On the Efficiency of Fair Trade, 64 REV. SOC. ECON. 447 (2006). 
This view ignores a more fundamental question, which is why there is no 
competition in the first place. If multinational corporations traded directly 
with small producers, competition for the products of small producers 
would raise prices. The problem is that information asymmetries preclude 
direct trading between corporations and small producers. This problem is 
similar to the problem of monopolist moneylenders with respect to lending 
to poor borrowers. When commercial lenders refrain from lending to the 
poor because of information problems, monopolist moneylenders may step 
in and lend at exploitative rates. See ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 
16, at 31–33. 
116 See NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 45, at 81, 87. 
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There is great difficulty in distinguishing among producers 
with different ability levels, especially as many small 
producers in developing countries do not meet the quality 
standards of export markets.117 It is also costly to monitor 
small producers to ensure that they exert a sufficient level of 
effort. Small producers may try to establish a reputation for 
high quality by using marketing tools, but with few 
exceptions, they tend to be too segregated or too poor to 
establish a brand. Accordingly, many producers, especially 
farmers, in developing countries have difficulties selling 
their products to multinational corporations even if they can 
meet high quality standards. 
(2) Donative Organizations: Many farmers lack 
training with respect to quality standards, production 
methodologies, and organizational skills.118 Donative 
organizations may provide them with assistance in the form 
of subsidized input, such as fertilizer, professional training, 
and technical assistance. Subsidizing fertilizers to enhance 
farm productivity has a longstanding history in attempts to 
jumpstart African agriculture.119 These programs, however, 
were found to have high costs and questionable benefits. In 
particular, programs have suffered from a variety of 
problems, including little actual use of fertilizers by farmers, 
lack of information on the benefits of fertilizers and how to 
properly use them, excessive use that may in fact reduce 
yields, delivery after the optimal fertilization period, and 
lack of complementary measures (e.g., quality inputs).120 
 
117 See id. at 35–36. 
118 See DEAN KARLAN & JACOB APPEL, MORE THAN GOOD 
INTENTIONS: HOW A NEW ECONOMICS IS HELPING TO SOLVE GLOBAL 
POVERTY 168 (2011); NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 45, at 34–39. 
119 Easterly, Can the West Save Africa?, supra note 84, at 416; 
MICHAEL MORRIS ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, FERTILIZER USE IN AFRICAN 
AGRICULTURE: LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES (2007), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/498591468204546593/pdf/3903
70AFR0Fert101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VJG-
CC55]. 
120 MORRIS ET AL., supra note 119, at 31–44. 
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Although yields do seem to increase following subsidization 
or distribution,121 there is a consensus that these programs 
tend to be inefficient. The record of training programs, 
known as agricultural extension, has been even more dismal. 
Agricultural training requires dealing with individual 
farmers, and each farmer’s needs are different.122 Among 
other problems, training programs have been found to suffer 
from lack of information as to farmers’ abilities and needs, 
difficulties in attributing impact to training efforts, little 
effort to learn from experience, and limited incentives to 
provide quality information to farmers.123 Moreover, given 
the difficulty of attributing outcomes, program staff tends to 
focus excessively on reporting input indicators, such as visits 
made, rather than material impact.124 There is also evidence 
that the training is only useful to farmers with higher 
skills,125 though it is presumably administered to all farmers 
in a given community. 
(3) Social Enterprises: FTSEs have a clear advantage 
in adjusting their subsidies to the attributes of their 
producers. Cafédirect’s business development programs, 
which include building capabilities in marketing, quality 
control, and crop management, are tailored to producers’ 
 
121 Esther Duflo et al., How High Are Rates of Return to Fertilizer? 
Evidence from Field Experiments in Kenya?, 98 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS 
& PROC. 482, 482 (2008). 
122 Easterly, Can the West Save Africa?, supra note 84, at 419. 
123 See Jock R. Anderson & Gershon Feder, Agricultural Extension: 
Good Intentions and Hard Realities, 19 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 41, 
55 (2004); Jock R. Anderson et al., The Rise and Fall of Training and Visit 
Extension: An Asian Mini-drama with an African Epilogue (World Bank 
Pol’y Res. Working Paper 3928, 2006), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917499 
[https://perma.cc/ DQ4Q-UEJ5]; WORLD BANK INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., 
WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE TO AGRICULTURE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 44, 54–
56 (2007), http://siteresources.worldbank.org 
EXTASSAGRISUBSAHAFR/Resources/ag_africa_eval.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F5K4-5VF7]. 
124 Anderson et al., supra note 123 at 6. 
125 Id. at 5. 
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specific needs.126 FTSEs have incentives to subsidize 
fertilizers and high-quality input to the extent that small 
farmers cannot afford to purchase them, as well as to teach 
farmers how to use them effectively. The effectiveness of 
their training and fertilizer subsidies is simply evidenced by 
their financial sustainability. The profitability of Cafédirect 
is itself an indication that the quality of the product is high 
and that the subsidies it allocates to its producers are 
sufficient to enable them to reach fully competitive abilities. 
FTSEs measure their beneficiaries’ attributes in the 
following ways: 
(i) Due diligence: FTSEs invest in studying the 
capabilities of producers. They send expeditions to 
developing countries to visit producers in order to sample the 
quality of their products. Often a donative organization will 
partner with a FTSE and assist with sampling and 
training.127 
(ii) Intensive monitoring: FTSEs typically sell high-
quality products, mainly to address concerns that the poor 
cannot produce quality products.128 Therefore, they naturally 
need to monitor the quality of the input they buy from 
producers. Although their relationship with their producer-
beneficiaries is generally expected to be long-term (as 
discussed below), there is no commitment to transacting with 
producers who turn out to be unable to perform. FTSEs learn 
which producers are more capable than others, as the quality 
of the input affects the quality of the end product. If 
consumers buy the product, this is an indication of its high 
quality, and vice versa. 
 
126  CAFÉDIRECT, supra note 52, at 3. 
127 See Karnani, supra note 73. For examples of cooperation by 
Starbucks with various donative organizations, see JAMES E. AUSTIN & 
CATE REAVIS, STARBUCKS AND CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL 12 (2004) 
(Harv. Bus. Sch. Case 9-303-055); Paul A. Argenti, Collaborating with 
Activists: How Starbucks Works with NGOs, 47 CAL. MGMT. REV. 91, 108–
10 (2004). 
128 NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 45, at 24. 
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(iii) Incentive mechanisms: First, the Fair Trade 
standards require small producers to be members of 
cooperatives, an arrangement under which producer-
members have equity ownership proportional to the quantity 
of product they sell through the cooperative.129 The function 
of the cooperative, other than to enable producers to pool 
resources and capital, is to address information 
asymmetries. The formation of cooperatives leads to 
assortative matching among producers, like group lending in 
the case of MFIs. Producers with sufficiently high 
capabilities will partner with producers with similar 
capabilities in order to ensure that their cooperative will 
supply products of sufficient quality, so that FTSEs continue 
to transact with them. Once the cooperative starts 
transacting, producers have incentives to monitor each other 
to ensure that each of them supplies high-quality input in a 
timely fashion. 
Second, Fair Trade standards contain requirements that 
enhance producers’ incentives to invest in the quality of their 
products by insuring producers against risks outside their 
control. FTSEs are expected to transact with small producers 
on a long-term basis,130 and importers that cut off small 
producers without good reason are likely to face reputational 
costs. Moreover, importers must pay either the market price 
or floor price of a commodity, whichever is higher, and must 
pre-finance up to 60% of orders.131 The reason for this is not 
only to transfer wealth to the producers; rather, the primary 
reason is that producers, who lack access to credit and 
insurance products, may have to cut costs at the expense of 
quality if they are subject to unexpected adverse shocks. 
Income smoothing and price insurance assure producers that 
they will not face short-term capital constraints or severe 
 
129 See FAIRTRADE STANDARD FOR SMALL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS, 
supra note 50, § 4.2. 
130 See id. § 4. 
131 FAIRTRADE STANDARD FOR COFFEE FOR SMALL PRODUCER 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 51, § 4.2. 
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loss as a result of a sharp decline in commodity prices or a 
drought. When given a price that reflects their efforts and 
the promise, albeit informal, of future transactions if they 
perform well, producers have stronger incentives to invest in 
quality. 
C. Employment Opportunities: Work Integration 
Social Enterprises 
(1) Commercial firms: Low-income individuals and 
other disadvantaged groups, such as disabled persons or 
people with a criminal record, tend to suffer from systemic 
unemployment.132 The reason for this appears to be the costs 
associated with evaluating their abilities. In any hiring 
decision, commercial firms face asymmetric information with 
respect to workers’ abilities. In developed labor markets, 
workers typically use their educational and professional 
qualifications, job referrals, and even their social 
backgrounds to signal their abilities to prospective 
employers. Such signaling mechanisms are particularly 
important in the case of low-skill jobs where employers care 
primarily about soft skills, such as discipline and 
attentiveness, which are difficult to observe prior to hiring. 
Poor workers in disadvantaged communities tend to lack 
access to education and have little or no employment track 
record.133 Moreover, the presence of a large number of 
workers with low skills makes it even harder for firms to 
identify those who have sufficient abilities. In these 
circumstances, firms often assume that all workers who 
belong to a disadvantaged group are unlikely to be capable 
workers. 
 
132 See TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, JOBS FOR THE POOR: CAN LABOR DEMAND 
POLICIES HELP?, 55–58 (2001). 
133 Id. at 57; Giulia Galera, Social Enterprises and the Integration of 
Disadvantaged Workers, in THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
THE WORLD OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISES, 105, 106–07 (Leonardo Becchetti & 
Carlo Borzaga eds., 2011). 
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(2) Donative Organizations: When workers lack 
sufficient capabilities, donative organizations may provide 
them with training with the goal of integrating unemployed 
and economically disadvantaged workers into the workforce. 
Many studies, however, show that the effectiveness of 
training programs tends to be partial at best. The benefits to 
participants in terms of earnings and employment are 
modest and do not persist over time.134 Interestingly, many 
studies suggest that the least able participants among the 
low-skilled populations benefit the least from them.135 This 
indicates that many programs are wasteful in the sense that 
training is provided to those whose abilities may be too low. 
In addition, training programs have been criticized for 
failing to meet the needs of commercial businesses.136 Thus, 
the evidence as a whole suggests that training programs 
have limited effectiveness. 
(3) Social Enterprises: WISEs have a clear advantage 
in adjusting training programs to the skill level of their 
beneficiaries and the particular needs of the business. The 
Greyston Bakery conducts multiple training sessions 
designed specifically to enhance the performance of its 
workers. The bakery’s profitability is itself an indication that 
the subsidies are effective in helping its workers reach a 
 
134 See James J. Heckman et al., The Economics and Econometrics of 
Active Labor Market Programs, in 3A HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 
1865, 2050–54 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); BARTIK, 
supra note 132, at 88–110; WORLD BANK INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., USING 
TRAINING TO BUILD CAPACITY FOR DEVELOPMENT: AN EVALUATION OF THE 
WORLD BANK’S PROJECT-BASED AND WBI TRAINING 36–38 (2008), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTTRABUICAPDEV/Resources/full_d
oc.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN8W-UJLU] [hereinafter IEG, USING TRAINING 
TO BUILD CAPACITY]. 
135 Heckman et al., supra note 134, at 2060–64. 
136 See BARTIK, supra note 132; IEG, USING TRAINING TO BUILD 
CAPACITY, supra note 134, at 36–38; John P. Martin & David Grubb, What 
Works and for Whom: A Review of OECD Countries’ Experiences with 
Active Labour Market Policies 15 (OECD Working Paper 2001:14), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=348621 
[https://perma.cc/8EWZ-NJTJ]. 
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competitive level. Again, there are three ways in which 
WISEs gather information: 
(i) Due diligence: Many WISEs, like any business, conduct 
diligence ex ante hiring decisions. WISEs may rely on 
referrals from training agencies, nonprofits, or welfare 
departments, and some conduct rigorous screening of 
referrals through interviews and tests.137 The Greyston 
Bakery, on the other hand, does not conduct any diligence ex 
ante hiring; rather, it relies on intensive monitoring and 
incentive mechanisms ex post hiring. 
(ii) Intensive monitoring: The Greyston Bakery hires 
workers on a “no questions asked” basis. At this stage it has 
limited information on its newly hired employees, who may 
have different levels of ability.138 The management then 
monitors their performance and gathers information on their 
abilities, especially their attitude, punctuality, and 
productivity. After one year’s apprenticeship, during which 
they are evaluated on a biweekly basis, they may be hired as 
full-time employees. In the course of their employment they 
receive ongoing professional development training, which 
includes intensive bi-weekly performance evaluations. By 
contrast, such intensive monitoring is not necessary in 
standard commercial bakeries, because workers tend to have 
higher abilities. Over time, the firm gathers information on 
employees. Workers who perform well may be promoted to 
better positions or move to working for higher salaries at 
commercial firms. On the other hand, workers who fail to 
meet certain minimum standards are laid off. The average 
turnover rate at Greyston is relatively high and entails high 
costs for the firm. 
(iii) Incentive mechanisms: As mentioned above, the 
workers of the Greyston Bakery who perform adequately 
may be hired as full-time employees after a year’s 
apprenticeship and may later be promoted to better 
 
137 BARTIK, supra note 132, at 219. 
138 Barker et al., Open Hiring Policy, supra note 58, at 1. 
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positions, including managerial ones.139 In addition, the 
bakery provides positive reinforcement to its employees, 
including a monthly award of distinction.140 Workers thus 
have incentives to reveal their true abilities. Workers have 
little incentive to understate their abilities because they may 
either lose their jobs or forgo opportunities to gain awards, 
promotions, or better salaries. 
D. Enhancing Consumer Welfare: Low-Cost Retailers 
and Service Providers 
(1) Commercial firms: Although multinationals are 
increasingly penetrating emerging markets, many rural 
markets remain underserved.141 Consequently, many 
essential products and services are often lacking in such 
markets. Examples include eyeglasses, health services, 
water purifiers, and bed nets. Many poor customers in 
developing markets actually have substantial purchasing 
power.142 In mature developed markets, commercial firms 
may produce affordable products designed specifically for low 
to moderate-income customers at a profit. The growth of low-
cost retailers and food chains, such as Walmart and 
McDonalds, is a pertinent example. In rural markets, 
however, the problem seems to be the costs of gathering 
information on consumers’ abilities and preferences. Rural 
communities typically include a large proportion of very low-
income consumers.143 Identifying those consumers who have 
sufficient abilities to buy existing or hypothetical products 
may be prohibitively costly. In addition, consumers’ 
preferences are difficult to observe. Traditional distribution 
channels, an absence of effective means of communication, 
 
139 Id. 
140 Barker et al., The Do-Goodie Product, supra note 58, at 6. 
141 PRAHALAD, supra note 41, at 37. 
142 See DARYL COLLINS ET AL., PORTFOLIOS OF THE POOR: HOW THE 
WORLD’S POOR LIVE ON $2 A DAY (2009). 
143 SANAL KUMAR VELAYUDHAN, RURAL MARKETING: TARGETING THE 
NON-URBAN CONSUMER 74–76 (2d ed. 2007). 
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and linguistic and cultural differences make it costly for 
firms to observe consumers’ spending patterns and tailor 
their products to consumers’ needs and preferences.144 
(2) Donative Organizations: The distribution of 
essential goods and services raises concerns similar to those 
of other subsidies, although the evidence is more equivocal. 
Empirical studies that have compared the effect of 
distributing versus selling products have yielded different 
results. Many studies concentrate on bed nets and water 
purifiers. On the one hand, there is significant evidence that 
bed nets donated by NGOs have been inappropriately used 
as fishing nets, not used at all, or even resold to others.145 
Moreover, another study relating to chlorine shows that 
consumers who pay higher prices are more likely to use it in 
their drinking water.146 On the other hand, many other 
studies suggest that demand for bed nets and health 
products is very sensitive to price, and usage rates decline 
sharply even when fees are very low.147 The reason appears 
to be limited knowledge about the benefits of bed nets and 
health products in preventing disease. These studies 
arguably support the view that bed nets and other essential 
products should be distributed to the poor for free. 
 
144  See KARAMCHANDANI ET AL., supra note 41, at 36–37, 113; 
PRAHALAD, supra note 41, at 37–38. Moreover, household income of the 
poor tends to be not only low, but also irregular and unpredictable. 
COLLINS ET AL., supra note 142, at 16–17; Ashish Karamchandani et al., Is 
the Bottom of the Pyramid Really for You?, HARV. BUS. REV., March 2011, 
at 107, 108. 
145 Noboru Minakawa et al., Unforeseen Misuses of Bed Nets in 
Fishing Villages Along Lake Victoria, 7 MALARIA J. 165, 165 (2008); 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INSECTICIDE-TREATED MOSQUITO NETS: A 
WHO POSITION STATEMENT 5 (2007), 
http://files.givewell.org/files/DWDA%202009/ 
Interventions/Nets/itnspospaperfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3MY-AT7V]. 
146 Nava Ashraf et al., Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? 
Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 2383, 
2385 (2010). 
147 See Easterly, Can the West Save Africa?, supra note 84, at 411. 
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Nonetheless, this evidence needs to be qualified. First, to 
the extent that consumers are able to pay for goods or 
services, as accepted in virtually all studies, subsidies are 
inherently wasteful. As many poor individuals can afford to 
pay at least a portion of the market price of a product, clearly 
the efficient policy would be to use fewer subsidies per 
beneficiary and produce more bed nets with the savings. 
Second, none of these studies compares donative 
organizations to social enterprises, such as low-cost sellers. 
The sale of products under these studies is done through a 
randomized process. Consequently, these studies cannot 
capture the incentives of social enterprises to create a 
market for their products and educate consumers about the 
benefits of the products and how to use them. Therefore, 
these studies do not prove that giving subsidies for free is 
necessarily a good policy.148 
(3) Social Enterprises: Low-cost sellers have incentives 
to gather information on consumers’ ability to pay for their 
products and to create a market for the product. Consider A 
to Z. The Acumen Fund’s investment in A to Z, together with 
other subsidies, has facilitated the production of millions of 
bed nets per year. Although distribution of bed nets remains 
essential for very low-income individuals, a social enterprise 
that differentiates among consumers in accordance with 
their ability to pay is a preferable approach to channeling 
subsidies. For a given investment, many more bed nets will 
be sold by a social enterprise than delivered by a donative 
organization that bears the full costs of each bed net.149 
 
148 For other criticisms of these studies, see Dani Rodrik, The New 
Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, but How Shall We Learn?, 
in WHAT WORKS IN DEVELOPMENT? THINKING BIG AND THINKING SMALL 
24, 28 (William Easterly & Jessica Cohen eds., 2010). There is also a 
concern that the subjects of these studies refuse to pay for products 
because they anticipate receiving them for free in the future. 
149 The Acumen Fund estimated that it would cost less than $0.02 to 
protect one individual from malaria for one year by making an investment 
in A to Z, compared to $0.84 through a donative organization. See ACUMEN 
FUND, THE BEST AVAILABLE CHARITABLE OPTION 3 (2007), 
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Tiered price schemes that differentiate among consumers are 
employed by other low-cost sellers, including both nonprofits 
such as VisionSpring, a low-cost manufacturer and seller of 
affordable reading glasses,150 and Aravind Eye Care System, 
which provides low-cost eye-care services,151 as well as for-
profits such as Ziqitza Healthcare Limited (“ZHL”), a private 
ambulance service provider in areas lacking high-quality 
emergency services.152 The output of each of these firms (e.g., 
glasses sold or eye surgeries performed) and their financial 
sustainability serve as indicators of the effectiveness of their 
subsidy allocation policies. 
Low-cost sellers measure their beneficiaries’ attributes 
mainly by using due diligence, given that their transactions 
with the consumer-beneficiaries are discrete rather than 
ongoing as in the case of loans or employment. Low-cost 
sellers invest more capital than commercial enterprises 
would in research on the relevant market to learn about 
consumers’ spending patterns and preferences, as well as 
distribution channels in these markets. In addition, they 
invest in marketing and in educating consumers on the 
benefits of certain products, such as bed nets and eye-care 
products. A to Z, together with its nonprofit partners, 
 
http://acumen.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/BACO-Concept-Paper-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/G79N-ZDU7]. 
150 See MOLLY CHRISTIANSEN & TED LONDON, SCOJO FOUNDATION: A 
VISION FOR GROWTH AT THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID (2008), https://oikos-
international.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/oikos_Cases_2008_Scojo 
_Foundation.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6YB-4ELW]; NICO CLEMMINCK & 
SACHIN KADAKIA, WHAT WORKS: SCOJO INDIA FOUNDATION 20–21 (2007), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVMARKETPLACE/Resources/What-
Works-Scojo-India.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T24-LFCA]. 
151 Aravind Eye Care System provides free surgeries to its poorest 
customers. See KARAMCHANDANI ET AL., supra note 41, at 30. 
152 ZHL charges patients who request to be taken to full-service 
hospitals a standard fee and offers a discounted rate to those taken to 
government hospitals. See GITA JOHAR & JOANNA HARRIES, DIAL 1298 FOR 
AMBULANCE MARKETING EMS IN MUMBAI 3–4 (2010), http://acumen.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/1298-Ambulance-Columbia-B-School.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LW6L-6S49]. 
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developed a marketing, retail, and pricing system to 
publicize and create demand for bed nets among the poor.153 
Moreover, low-cost sellers design business models tailored to 
the needs and preferences of low-income households, 
including not only tiered pricing, but also innovative cost-
cutting methods and specialized distribution channels. The 
Aravind Eye Care service reduces the demand on doctors’ 
time by training skilled paramedics to undertake 
standardized clinical tasks, so that doctors’ time is spent on 
surgeries.154 VisionSpring has created an innovative 
distribution system that relies on a web of local 
entrepreneurs with good reputations and connections in 
rural communities. Finally, after they start offering new 
products, low-cost sellers further continue to evaluate 
consumers’ preferences, adjust pricing, and design new 
products.155 
 
V. COMMITMENT DEVICES AND CHOICE OF 
LEGAL FORM 
The foregoing Section assumed that social enterprises 
have a commitment to transacting with disadvantaged 
individuals. As explained above, for-profit social enterprises 
may use one of three commitment devices—certification, 
contract, and control mechanisms156—while nonprofit social 
enterprises rely on the non-distribution constraint.157 The 
purpose of this Section is to examine in greater detail the 
structure and function of different commitment devices. 
Social enterprises invariably receive subsidies. In theory, 
it would be ideal if social enterprises could provide detailed 
information on the use of subsidies and their effects on 
 
153 See KARUGU & MWENDWA, supra note 42, at 10–11. 
154 KARAMCHANDANI ET AL., supra note 41, at 62. 
155  See, e.g., CHRISTIANSEN & LONDON, supra note 150, at 6 (describing 
how VisionSpring adjusts its strategy and pricing to market demand). 
156 See supra Section II.A.2. 
157 See supra Section II.A.3. 
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beneficiaries’ welfare. However, monitoring the use of 
subsidies and evaluating their benefits is very costly. Hence, 
the solution is simply to create organizations that have 
incentives to use subsidies effectively. Transacting with 
patron-beneficiaries is the mechanism that gives social 
enterprises incentives and tools to use subsidies effectively. 
The essence of commitment devices is that a nonprofit is 
responsible for identifying a class of patron-beneficiaries, 
such as borrowers or workers, and verifying the transactions 
with them. While it is very costly to evaluate the 
effectiveness of subsidies in achieving development missions, 
it is relatively simple for nonprofits to verify transactions 
with patron-beneficiaries. Thus, transacting with the 
beneficiaries not only underlies the measurement role of 
social enterprises, but also facilitates the formation of social 
enterprises as for-profits. 
To be sure, commitment devices may go beyond verifying 
the transaction with beneficiaries. Where the subsidy 
providers expect a social enterprise to transact with 
beneficiaries with below-competitive abilities who need some 
form of subsidy (e.g., a better price or training), the 
commitment devices also verify that such subsidies are 
indeed distributed to beneficiaries.158 Otherwise, there is a 
risk that social enterprises will transact exclusively with 
patron-beneficiaries with fully competitive abilities (who do 
not need subsidies) and those who control the organization 
will appropriate that part of the subsidies.159 A good example 
is the Fair Trade standards, which require producers to 
provide a floor price and a social premium. 
Before embarking on the analysis of different devices, it is 
worth mentioning that the ability of social enterprises to 
form as both for-profits and nonprofits gives some credence 
 
158 In fact, the same commitment devices can be used to commit to 
any form of hybrid organization, for example, corporate charity. See infra 
Part VI. 
159 This risk is often referred to as “mission-drift.” See infra Section 
VII.A. 
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to the claim that the distinction between the for-profit and 
nonprofit forms has been gradually eroding.160 Nonetheless, 
it is important to emphasize that all the commitment devices 
of for-profit social enterprises rely on organizations that are 
subject to the non-distribution constraint to monitor the for-
profit entity. Accordingly, contrary to some recent claims 
that the non-distribution constraint has lost its usefulness as 
a commitment device,161 it remains a key component of the 
commitment devices associated with for-profit social 
enterprises. The rationale is that organizations that are 
subject to a non-distribution constraint can be trusted to 
monitor for-profits. 
A. Certification Mechanisms 
Certification mechanisms consist of a nonprofit or 
government agency that evaluates whether or not firms 
satisfy certain standards. Certification is feasible only when 
it is possible to create uniform standards with respect to both 
the class of beneficiaries and the type of subsidies that 
should be allocated to them. The best-known example is Fair 
Trade certification described above. FLO certifies the class of 
patron-beneficiaries as “small producers,” and it ensures 
through audits and inspections that the producers are 
allocated subsidies in the form of the Fair Trade minimum 
 
160 See THE ASPEN INST., ENTERPRISING ORGANIZATIONS: NEW ASSET-
BASED AND OTHER INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO SOLVING SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 1, 2 (2005), 
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/E
nterprisingOrgs%20(for%20web).pdf [https://perma.cc/L9CF-TPF2]; 
Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle, Nonprofits and Business: A New 
World of Innovation and Adaptation, in NONPROFITS AND BUSINESS 1 
(Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2008); Alter, supra note 9, at 
205; Jonathan Conning & Jonathan Morduch, Microfinance and Social 
Investment, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 407, 414 (2011). 
161 See DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW RESTRAINTS ON 
NONPROFITS UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL 116–19 (2008); Malani & 
Posner, supra note 6, at 2021–22; Clara Miller, The Equity Capital Gap, 
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2008, at 41–42. 
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price, a social premium, and pre-financing of up to 60% of 
the orders.162 Because coffee and other agricultural products, 
such as bananas, are traded on global commodity exchanges, 
it is possible to identify commodity prices and prescribe 
standards for financing and premiums. Small producers can 
also be identified relatively easily, albeit imperfectly, by 
simply referring to those farmers who rely on family labor. 
By contrast, in industries such as banking and investment, 
where prices and business practice can vary from one firm to 
another, it is harder to create a uniform standard. 
A unique feature of fair trade certification is that the 
certification is per each unit of product. The Fair Trade label 
is attached to products that comply with the Fair Trade 
standards. The certification signals to consumers that 
products are deserving of a subsidy. Certification per product 
enables firms to have both a social enterprise and a profit-
maximizing enterprise operated by the same organization 
(e.g., Starbucks selling fair trade products). 
When the subsidies flow from other sources, such as the 
government, a common approach is to use certification of the 
firm as a whole. An example discussed above is certification 
by the CDFI Fund, which provides below-market rate 
investments and guarantees to eligible CDFIs.163 The class of 
beneficiaries is defined by reference to aggregate wealth 
measures of the relevant market, defined to include areas 
where the percentage of the population living in poverty is at 
least 20%, where the median family income is below 80% of 
the national average, or where the unemployment rate is 1.5 
times the national average.164 Another example is 
incorporation under certain European hybrid legal forms 
(e.g., the Italian social cooperative), which require that at 
least a certain percentage of the workers of the incorporating 
 
162 See supra note 51. 
163 CDFI COALITION, supra note 31. 
164 12 C.F.R. § 1805.201(b)(3)(ii)(C) (2016). 
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firm belong to a class of disadvantaged individuals.165 
Incorporation as a hybrid essentially constitutes a 
certification of the firm as a WISE and makes the firm 
eligible for certain government subsidies. 
B. Contractual Mechanisms 
An alternative commitment device is a contract with a 
nonprofit organization stipulating that the subsidies will be 
used for their intended purpose.166 Contractual mechanisms 
are typically used when the subsidy to the social enterprise 
is provided by a donative organization. Contractual 
mechanisms allow greater flexibility than certification and 
individual tailoring in defining the class of beneficiaries and 
the type of disbursals allocated to them. Low-cost sellers may 
need flexibility in adjusting their prices and discounts to 
different customers who have different levels of wealth. As 
discussed above, as part of its partnership with various 
nonprofit organizations, including the World Health 
Organization and NGOs, A to Z is committed to marketing 
and selling bed nets at different discounts funded by the 
partnership or the local government. With respect to CDFIs, 
as mentioned above, the CDFI Fund is required to enter into 
an Assistance Agreement with certified CDFIs that are 
awarded a subsidy.167 The agreement must specify, inter 
alia, the CDFI’s performance goals and the terms offered to 
low-income borrowers.168 While certification is used to define 
the class of beneficiaries, greater flexibility is necessary to 
 
165 See Cafaggi & Iamiceli, supra note 5, at 7–14; see also Francine J. 
Lipman, Enabling Work for People with Disabilities: A Post-Integrationist 
Revision of Underutilized Tax Incentives, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 393, 429–30 
(2003) (defining disadvantaged individuals to include disabled people, ex-
offenders, welfare recipients or recipients of unemployment insurance). 
166  See Allen R. Bromberger, A New Type of Hybrid, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV., Spring 2011, at 49. 
167 12 C.F.R. § 1805.801 (2016). 
168 Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 1805.803 (2016). 
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tailor the terms provided to the beneficiaries’ economic and 
social conditions. 
C. Control Mechanisms 
The most flexible commitment device is control by a 
nonprofit. The controlling nonprofit typically provides 
subsidies to the social enterprise, for example subsidized 
capital. Control allows the nonprofit owner to determine the 
class of beneficiaries and the type of disbursals (if any). The 
Greyston Bakery is owned by a single owner, the Greyston 
Foundation.169 Complete ownership of the social enterprise, 
however, is not necessary. As discussed above, a controlling 
stake in Compartamos, whose shares are publicly listed, is 
held by nonprofits, such as NGOs and foundations. This 
mechanism provides the nonprofit owners reasonable 
assurance that the firm will not change its mission if lending 
to low-income persons entails opportunity costs. 
An example of a social investment firm is the IGNIA 
Fund, which invests in businesses in developing countries in 
various fields, such as healthcare services and organic 
farming. The fund is structured as a limited partnership (i.e., 
a for-profit entity), but is owned by the International 
Finance Corporation, foundations, and social 
entrepreneurs.170 Many low-cost sellers also use control 
mechanisms. ZHL, described above,171 is owned by the 
 
169 As the Greyston Bakery is wholly owned by a nonprofit, it may be 
argued that it should simply form as a nonprofit. However, as pointed out 
supra Section II.A.1, the bakery pays below-market wages to its workers, 
and therefore it is arguably not operating exclusively for an exempt 
purpose under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Further, the Greyston Foundation may 
possibly be contemplating the sale of a stake in the bakery to private 
investors. In fact, seemingly for this reason, the Greyston bakery recently 
reincorporated as a New York Benefit Corporation. See infra Section IX.A. 
170 Author’s conversation with Alonso Bustamante Guerra, Senior 
Analyst, IGNIA Fund, (Oct. 19, 2009); see also Investors, IGNIA, 
http://www.ignia.com.mx/bop/investors.php [https://perma.cc/R8XY-HGB3] 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
171 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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Acumen Fund (a nonprofit social investment firm) and social 
entrepreneurs. 
Another way to implement a control mechanism is to 
place the voting rights, at least on fundamental issues, in the 
hands of a nonprofit. For example, the shares of the social 
investment firm, Triodos Bank, are held by a foundation that 
makes voting decisions on behalf of the holders of depository 
receipts.172 Similarly, as described above, the guardian share 
of Cafédirect is held by a subsidiary of Oxfam International 
and a cooperative of producers that transact with the firm. 
The guardian share has the right to block any proposal, 
including a takeover that might compromise the firm’s social 
mission.173 
As compared to other commitment devices, control 
mechanisms allow social enterprises flexibility in deciding 
which beneficiaries merit assistance and what kind of 
subsidies they should receive. This appears to be the reason 
why MFIs and social investment firms use control 
mechanisms. Creating a uniform standard for developing 
countries in the fields of banking, investment, retail, and 
services may be difficult. For example, Compartamos lends 
mainly to the moderately poor and the vulnerable non-
poor.174 Other for-profit MFIs that have adopted control 
mechanisms transact with customers who need greater 
assistance and discounted interest rates.175 Similarly, 
whereas the IGNIA Fund seeks to generate returns 
equivalent to those of private equity firms, Triodos Bank 
earns moderate returns on equity.176 
By contrast, the CDFI regime is more specific in nature. 
The certification of CDFIs and their contracts with the CDFI 
 
172 For a detailed description, see supra Section II.A.1. 
173 See supra Section II.A.1. 
174 COMPARTAMOS OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 26, at 77. 
175 See Thomas Dichter, Basix (India): The Challenges of Permanently 
Pioneering (Jan. 20, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
176 TRIODOS BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2015, supra note 38, at 25 (noting a 
return on equity of 5.5% in 2015). 
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Fund (i.e., the Assistance Agreements) determine specific 
standards. In developed countries where measures of poverty 
and income are widely available and the banking system is 
well developed, there is better information on which 
customers should count as beneficiaries and what terms 
should be afforded to them. It is harder to create specific 
standards in developing countries, where there is a greater 
variety of investees in terms of abilities. 
The flexibility of control mechanisms is also reinforced by 
their use by FTSEs, such as Cafédirect. Unlike other FTSEs, 
such as Starbucks, Cafédirect sells exclusively fair trade 
products. The control mechanism allows the firm to commit 
to more demanding standards than those prescribed by FLO. 
Thus, Cafédirect buys inputs from producers who are less 
capable than other small producers that qualify as such for 
the purpose of certification, pays larger premiums to its 
producers than those required by FLO, and provides more 
training to them. Thus, control mechanisms enable firms to 
tailor the Fair Trade standards to their own business model. 
In addition, control mechanisms usually serve as a 
commitment by the firm to the owners who provide the 
subsidy to the firm. Certification and contractual 
mechanisms provide assurance mainly to external subsidy 
providers, such as customers or government agencies. The 
subsidy to MFIs and social investment firms is usually 
provided by their nonprofit owners in the form of capital and 
below-market returns. The nonprofit owners of 
Compartamos can ensure that their firm will not change its 
business and cease to serve low-income customers. In the 
case of FTSEs, certification per product is directed towards 
customers, but is inadequate to assure nonprofit owners that 
their subsidies will be committed to the long-term mission of 
the firm. Firms that use product certification, such as 
Starbucks, may abandon their fair trade business without 
expropriating any subsidies because the subsidies, i.e., the 
premiums over market prices, are per product. But, owners 
may want to ensure that the firm will remain committed to 
transacting with disadvantaged individuals, at least for as 
long as they continue to own it. This is another reason why 
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Cafédirect uses a control mechanism in addition to 
certification. 
D. The Nonprofit Form 
Many social enterprises continue to form as commercial 
nonprofits.177 A key reason for choosing the nonprofit form is 
its tax advantages in sourcing donations and income tax 
exemptions.178 When social enterprises are likely to have low 
profitability, they are more likely to rely on donations and 
income tax exemptions. Low profitability can arise either 
because such firms transact with beneficiaries with 
relatively low abilities who need substantial disbursals, or 
because there is a high variance in beneficiaries’ abilities 
that requires the firm to invest substantial resources in 
measurement and tailoring subsidies to their needs. 
As discussed above, Compartamos makes loans primarily 
to moderately poor borrowers in markets where there is 
relatively better information on borrowers’ creditworthiness, 
and it charges high interest rates. By contrast, nonprofit 
MFIs, such as ASA and BRAC, provide very small loans to 
poorer borrowers, mainly women, in rural markets where 
information is scarce. Therefore, they charge relatively low 
interest rates and provide a range of services to their 
borrowers, including schooling, training, and help with 
business and marketing plans.179 In fact, Compartamos itself 
started out as a nonprofit firm and converted into a for-profit 
as its borrowers developed stronger business acumen and 
credit history, and the firm acquired better information on 
its target market.180 
 
177 See supra Section II.A.3. 
178 Nonprofit social enterprises also have stronger incentives to 
transact with beneficiaries with lower abilities. See infra Section VII.A. 
179 ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 22. 
180 See Compartamos Banco, ACCION, https://www.accion.org/our-
impact/compartamos-banco [https://perma.cc/J7H7-DPGN] (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2017). An additional example is the Acumen Fund, a nonprofit 
that targets investments that may not generate market returns, and 
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VI. OTHER FORMS OF HYBRID ORGANIZATION 
Most accounts of hybrid organizations do not distinguish 
between social enterprise and all other types of hybrid 
organization. From a policy perspective, equating social 
enterprises to other hybrid organizations may yield ill-
advised policy recommendations because many hybrid 
organizations, especially corporations that engage in 
corporate social responsibility and corporate charity, do not 
perform the measurement role of social enterprises. In fact, 
as shown below, most of them engage in transferring or 
giving subsidies to beneficiaries, and therefore, are less 
likely to be effective in addressing complex development 
missions. Thus, policy recommendations to extend tax 
benefits to organizations with a mixed mission are likely to 
be misguided.181 
A. Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate 
Charity 
In its most standard form, corporate social responsibility 
(“CSR”) policies and corporate charity involve the allocation 
of a subsidy from a for-profit firm to external beneficiaries, 
whether as a monetary donation to a donative organization 
(e.g., Oxfam) or a training subsidy to the poor.182 In either of 
these cases, the firm has no commitment to transacting with 
beneficiaries as patrons. As a result, the effectiveness of CSR 
and corporate charity are subject to the same problems as 
subsidies allocated by donative organizations. In the absence 
of information on external beneficiaries, subsidies are 
 
therefore the Acumen Fund partly relies on donative funding. See LEE, 
supra note 103. The IGNIA Fund, by contrast, is a for-profit limited 
partnership that seeks to make commercial returns on its investments. 
See Our Story, IGNIA, http://www.ignia.mx/about-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/2NPF-CKJ4] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
181 One example is Malani & Posner’s proposal to extend tax benefits 
to for-profits for their charitable or socially responsible activities. See 
Malani & Posner, supra note 6. 
182 See supra Section II.C. 
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unlikely to be effective. Moreover, most for-profit 
corporations that engage in CSR or corporate charity do not 
usually adopt a commitment device. Accordingly, there is a 
clear risk that for-profit corporations will exaggerate the 
magnitude and effectiveness of their CSR policies in order to 
enhance their reputations among consumers.183 Drawing 
goodwill and additional revenues from consumers by 
exaggerating the effect and extent of CSR policies may be 
viewed as an expropriation of subsidies from consumers.184 
An example of the limited effectiveness of CSR is in fact 
Google’s celebrated charitable arm described above. 
Although Google continues to donate generously to 
charitable causes, Google.org has so far failed to live up to its 
ambitious goal of creating novel solutions to poverty 
alleviation and climate change.185 
Some corporations do actually adopt commitment devices 
that implement CSR policies or corporate charity, and to this 
extent, there is a lesser risk of expropriation. RedF is an 
example of a certification mechanism. RedF is an LLC that 
licenses the Red trademark to commercial firms, including 
Apple, Starbucks and Gap;186 these firms attach the Red 
label to certain products. When customers buy Red products, 
the firm is committed under its contract with RedF to 
 
183 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
184 In fact, CSR policies and corporate charity may even be used by 
inefficient managers to entrench themselves by gaining stakeholders’ and 
media support or to support charities affiliated with CEOs at the expense 
of shareholder value. See Giovanni Cespa & Giacinta Cestone, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment, 16 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. Strategy 741 (2007); Ronald W. Masulis and Syed Walid Reza, 
Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 592 (2015). 
185 See Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It? 54 B.C. L. REV.  
2025, 2034–35 (2014); Stephanie Strom & Miguel Helft, Google Finds It 
Hard to Reinvent Philanthropy, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 29, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/business/30charity.html 
[https://perma.cc/A9S2-ARJF]. 
186 Sarah Dadush, Profiting in (Red): The Need for Enhanced 
Transparency in Cause-Related Marketing, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
1269, 1270 (2010). 
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making a certain donation, for example to the Global Fund, a 
donative organization dedicated to fighting AIDS.187 Thus 
the firm adjusts the amount of its donations in accordance 
with the volume of purchases of Red products by customers. 
However, while this may be a novel mechanism for firms to 
market their charitable activities and receive feedback from 
customers concerning their desired volume, it is essentially a 
form of corporate charity rather than a social enterprise. 
An example of a control mechanism used as a 
commitment to charity is Better World Books, a firm that 
sells used books and is committed to supporting literacy 
groups.188 Many of the books sold by the firm are donated to 
it to support its social mission. Literacy nonprofits have 
options in Better World Books that are vested on two 
metrics, performance measures of their social mission and 
how many donated books they bring in. The vested options 
ensure that upon sale of the firm, the nonprofits will receive 
a proportion of the sale amount.189 Performance, which is 
related to students’ progress, is relatively easy to measure, 
and the disbursals to the literacy nonprofits appear to be 
effective. Again, the basic structure of Better World Books, 
albeit highly innovative, is identical to corporate charity, i.e., 
a for-profit making a donation to a nonprofit. In this case, 
though, there seems to be measurable information on the 
effectiveness of subsidies. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that in some cases CSR policies 
actually do involve the allocation of a subsidy to a patron-
beneficiary, rather than an external beneficiary. Although 
the distinction is a subtle one, such CSR policies are 
distinguishable from social enterprises. Consider 
multinationals, such as Nike and Levi’s, which pay premium 
 
187 Id. The exact amount of the donations is not actually transparent, 
and to this extent there is in fact a risk of expropriation. See id. at 1272–
73. 
188 See Kevin Jones, Mission Insurance: How to Structure a Social 
Enterprise So Its Social and Environmental Goals Survive into the Future, 
5 COMMUNITY DEV. INV. REV. 1 (2009). 
189 Id. at 5–6. 
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wages to their workers in developing countries and avoid 
transacting with sweatshops. Such firms appear structurally 
similar to WISEs because they channel subsidies to their 
workers. However, these policies are mainly driven by the 
perceived unfairness of low wages and harsh working 
conditions as compared to equivalent standards in developed 
countries,190 even though in economic terms, wages and 
working conditions are both efficient and higher than those 
offered by local firms. 
These policies are different from WISEs with regard to 
the problems they are designed to address, especially the 
inability of capable workers from disadvantaged 
backgrounds to obtain employment. In this case, the workers 
are already employed and receive an efficient wage. 
Accordingly, it does not make sense to view Nike or Levi’s as 
having a commitment to transacting with their workers, as it 
is already profit-maximizing to transact with them even 
without a subsidy. The workers are not individuals that 
suffer from systemic unemployment, and employing them 
does not serve the measurement role performed by social 
enterprises. Premium wages and better working conditions 
are simply a disbursal of a subsidy to the existing patrons of 
the firm. 
To be sure, this type of subsidy may be desirable where 
governments fail to regulate workers’ rights and minimum 
working conditions, especially in developing countries. 
However, such CSR policies are typically implemented only 
as a response to blatant governmental failures and where 
commercial firms face high reputational costs. Additionally, 
firms that make these subsidies do not usually adopt a 
commitment device. Therefore, without appropriate 
government regulation or at least NGO supervision, working 
 
190 See Geoffrey Heal, Corporate Social Responsibility: An Economic 
and Financial Framework, 30 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS., 387, 389, 
392–93 (2005). 
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conditions at standard commercial firms are likely to 
suffer.191 
B. Socially Responsible Investing 
In recent decades, institutional investors, such as pension 
funds and mutual funds, have become increasingly engaged 
in socially responsible investing (“SRI”). As of 2014, $6.57 
trillion in total assets under professional management in the 
United States used at least one SRI strategy.192 SRI refers to 
investment strategies that consider both financial return and 
some social good, especially environmental, social, and 
governance (“ESG”) issues. ESG issues range from 
environmental efficiency, through human rights and 
diversity, to corporate governance. The most common 
manifestations of SRI are negative screening of companies 
that engage in providing goods or services like alcohol, 
tobacco, or gambling, and shareholder advocacy on ESG 
issues. Some forms of social enterprise referred to as 
“community investing” are also commonly included under 
SRI, such as CDFIs and social investment firms. Though 
community investing is growing at a rapid rate as an asset 
class, its assets are only a marginal fraction of SRI. 
At any rate, to view SRI and social enterprise as 
synonymous is misguided. First, it is not clear whether SRI 
(other than community investing) is a subsidized form of 
organization. In fact, some studies find that returns on SRI 
funds are better than on other funds.193 Additionally, the 
 
191 To be sure, WISEs, like any other firm, may also engage in CSR 
and corporate charity by providing premium wages; the key point is that 
this is not a role that WISEs need to perform to qualify as social 
enterprises. 
192 THE FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INV., REPORT ON US 
SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS 12 (2014), 
http://www.ussif.org/store_category.asp?id=4 [https://perma.cc/BAE3-
9T5J]. 
193 See, e.g., Michael L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon, Beyond 
Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Relationship between Social Responsibility 
and Financial Performance, 27 STRATEGY MGMT. J. 1101, 1103 (2006); 
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recent trend to treat corporate governance as an ESG issue 
appears to be motivated by a desire to enhance shareholder 
value rather than transfer subsidies to third parties. 
Therefore, SRI funds are not necessarily a type of hybrid 
organization. Second, even if SRI in its most common form 
qualifies as a subsidized commercial enterprise (i.e., a hybrid 
organization), SRI funds do not transact with their 
beneficiaries. As a result, measuring the social impact of SRI 
as compared to a standard form of investing is inherently 
imprecise. In addition, it is noteworthy that commitment 
devices may be weak in some SRI funds. While some funds 
can change their social criteria only with a shareholder vote, 
other funds can alter investing policy without consulting the 
shareholders.194 Hence, there is some risk that capital raised 
under one set of ESG issues will be applied to advance a 
weaker or stronger set of issues. 
C. Social Ratings 
Partly to address the measurement problem inherent in 
social missions, many organizations are developing new 
social rating mechanisms for evaluating the social impact of 
for-profit firms. One prominent example is B-Lab, a 
nonprofit that certifies companies as “B-Corps” and rates 
them in accordance with certain criteria relating to 
governance, workers, community, and the environment.195 
 
Christopher C. Geczy et al., Investing in Socially Responsible Mutual 
Funds (Oct. 2005), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=416380 
[https://perma.cc/B2A4-8JCX]. 
194 Geczy et al., supra note 193, at 12. 
195 Other rating mechanisms include the following: (1) the Global 
Reporting Initiative (“GRI”), a nonprofit that certifies companies’ 
sustainability reports in accordance with certain standards, see About 
GRI, GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/Information/about-
gri/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/PS9Y-FYEL] (last visited Mar. 18, 
2017); (2) the Global Impact Rating System (“GIIRS”), a nonprofit that 
rates companies’ social and environmental impact using a different set of 
standards, the Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (“IRIS”), see 
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There is, however, uncertainty regarding which factors 
should be included in such standards. For example, the first 
public corporation certified as a B-Corp, Etsy Inc., a company 
that operates an online marketplace for crafts, was praised 
for its commitment to social and environmental goals.196 
However, it is hard to see how Etsy is materially different 
from standard commercial firms, as it doesn’t seem to 
channel material subsidies to third parties. Moreover, there 
has been substantial pressure from tax activists to deny 
Etsy’s re-certification as a B-Corp because of its aggressive 
tax planning that involved using an Irish subsidiary to 
minimize tax liability.197 This arguably casts doubt on Etsy’s 
commitment to produce public benefits. 
To be sure, some of the criteria embedded in B-Lab’s 
standards correspond to the elements that characterize 
social enterprises, such as the percentage of disadvantaged 
employees, or whether the firm provides services to poor 
customers. For example, B-Lab’s rating does reward 
companies for employing disadvantaged workers. However, 
 
What GIIRLS Does, GIIRLS, http://giirs.nonprofitsoapbox.com/about-
giirs/about [https://perma.cc/54FJ-E7D2] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) and 
About IRIS, IRIS, https://iris.thegiin.org/about-iris 
[https://perma.cc/2RRK-PJ7N] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017); (3) the Social 
Return on Investment (“SROI”) Network, which trains practitioners to 
quantify in monetary terms the social and environmental impact of 
companies in accordance with the SROI principles, see Practitioner 
Training, SOCIAL VALUE, http://www.socialvalueuk.org/sroi-practitioner-
training/ [https://perma.cc/MA2Q-DACH] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) and 
The SROI Network, IRIS, https://iris.thegiin.org/users/profile/the-sroi-
network [https://perma.cc/5VX2-Z7K5] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).  
196 See Jena McGregor, What Etsy, Patagonia and Warby Parker Have 
in Common, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2015/04/20/what-
etsy-patagonia-and-warby-parker-have-in-common/ 
[https://perma.cc/KNN9-NRRS]. 
197 See Alex Barinka & Jesse Drucker, Etsy Taps Secret Irish Tax 
Haven and Brags About Transparency at Home, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 
2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-
14/etsy-taps-secret-irish-tax-haven-and-touts-transparency-at-home 
[https://perma.cc/FJ3R-FARJ]. 
ELDAR – FINAL   
166 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
B-Lab’s standards go far beyond these elements to include a 
host of measures whose value is debatable.198 First, these 
metrics include activities whose benefits flow to external 
beneficiaries, such as corporate charity or environmentally 
friendly policies. But, as argued throughout this Article, the 
benefits to external beneficiaries are hard to measure and 
subject to uncertainty. There is little evidence that B-Lab or 
any other social rating organization has created a credible 
way to track and quantify such benefits. Second, the utility 
of many of the policies advocated by these standards, such as 
employee ownership or involving stakeholders in decision-
making, is either questionable or context-dependent. Third, 
certain policies, such as strong corporate governance 
provisions, are potentially profit-maximizing, and it is not 
clear why they should be mixed up with standards that 
measure social impact. Finally, some of these standards and 
their implementation tend to be opaque and depend on 
subjective assessment of impacts.199 There is a concern that 
subsidies provided by trusting consumers may be 
expropriated by managers of firms that obtain social ratings 
that exceed their true contributions to altruistic causes. 
D. Environmentally Friendly Firms 
Firms that adopt environmentally friendly policies may 
be viewed as hybrid organizations mainly because their 
 
198 Recently, the Greyston Bakery has obtained B-Corp certification. 
Interestingly, Greyston ranks high on measures of “community” but below 
the median on measures of “workers” which evaluate how the firm treats 
its workers through compensation, employment opportunities, health and 
safety, etc. See Greyston Bakery, Inc., B CORP., 
https://www.bcorporation.net/community/greyston-bakery-inc 
[https://perma.cc/9HRJ-Q76X] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
199 See BUGG-LEVINE & EMERSON, supra note 3, at 163–186; Alnoor 
Ebrahim & V. Kasturi Rangan, The Limits of Nonprofit Impact: A 
Contingency Framework for Measuring Social Performance 9–13 (Harvard 
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-099, 2010), 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-099.pdf 
venture[https://perma.cc/8K3U-TUP4]. 
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consumers pay subsidies in the form of price premiums, 
which the firms use to produce public goods.200 There are two 
main types of environmentally friendly firms. The first type 
includes firms such as Walmart and IBM that have adopted 
environmentally friendly policies as part of their CSR 
agenda to boost reputation and goodwill.201 Many of these 
firms have not adopted a commitment device, and therefore 
there is a risk that they will draw goodwill and subsidies 
from consumers while overstating the extent of their 
contribution to the environment, a practice known as green-
washing. To take one stark example, British Petroleum, an 
oil company that was commended for its environmental 
initiatives, turned out to have a troubling record of violating 
safety regulations, culminating in the oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010. 202 
The second type involves firms that have adopted a 
commitment device. An example is Patagonia, a firm that 
produces outdoor clothing using materials that are less 
harmful to the environment, such as organic cotton, and 
environmentally friendly production processes, including 
reduction of its carbon emissions and the use of recycled 
materials.203 Patagonia’s consumers appear to pay a 
 
200 To be sure, some environmentally friendly policies may be profit-
maximizing without a subsidy, for example, reducing the use of gas or 
fuels. 
201 See DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD: 
HOW SMART COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, 
CREATE VALUE, AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 7–8, 106 (2006). 
202 The company was in fact ranked first among international firms 
for its environmental impact. Id., at 25; NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE 
GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING (2011), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMT2-M4X7]. 
203 See FOREST REINHARDT ET AL., PATAGONIA (2004) (Harv. Bus. Sch. 
Case 9-703-035) [hereinafter PATAGONIA 1]; FOREST REINHARDT ET AL., 
PATAGONIA (2010) (Harv. Bus. Sch. Case 9-711-020) [hereinafter 
PATAGONIA 2]. 
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premium for the environmental quality of its products,204 and 
its sole owner seems willing to accept lower rates to fund the 
firm’s environmental mission.205 Patagonia has adopted 
several commitment devices. First, the firm is owned by a 
social entrepreneur who has a reputation for his 
commitment to the environment. Second, some of its 
products are certified by the bluesign® system, a 
certification awarded to textile products that comply with 
standards relating to energy use, water consumption and use 
of hazardous chemicals.206 Moreover, the firm has obtained 
certification as a B-Corp, which includes environmental 
performance.207 
Although Patagonia’s commitment to environmental 
causes is laudable, the true benefits of its policies are 
difficult to measure. Despite a growing consensus on the 
benefits of protecting the environment, such benefits are not 
easily observable and may be difficult to quantify. One 
possible explanation for this is that the beneficiaries of 
environmentally friendly, or more generally public goods, 
firms are external. Public goods are non-rival and non-
excludable, so that in principle anyone can consume them. 
Environmentally friendly firms thus cannot transact with 
their beneficiaries who consume those public goods; anyone 
can enjoy the cleaner air and water that result from the 
firms’ policies. Accordingly, they have limited tools to 
evaluate the benefits of their environmental policies. 
To be sure, environmentally friendly firms perform an 
important function. Given their commitment to adopting 
 
204 See PATAGONIA 1, supra note 203, at 10 (Patagonia’s products sell 
for 15% to 50% or more above other similar brands, although this 
premium may be due to product quality). 
205 See PATAGONIA 2, supra note 203, at 4, 27 (noting that Patagonia’s 
margins decreased following the shift to organic cotton). 
206 See BLUESIGN, https://www.bluesign.com/ [https://perma.cc/42ZP-
CAM9] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
207 See Patagonia, Inc., B CORP., 
https://www.bcorporation.net/community/patagonia-inc 
[https://perma.cc/EVG3-Q3J7] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
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environmentally friendly processes, these firms have a profit 
incentive to reduce the costs of such processes. The subsidies 
in these firms are used to fund the costs of creating an 
efficient business model that generates public goods. In some 
cases, such business models may fail. For example, there 
have been several unsuccessful attempts to make shoes from 
recyclable materials.208 On the other hand, Patagonia has 
successfully developed innovative processes for making 
clothes from organic cotton.209 Reducing the production costs 
of environmentally friendly products is important for the 
sake of leading other firms to adopt similar policies or 
making a case for environmental regulation. 
E. Using Hybrid Organizations to Increase Donative 
Capital 
While social enterprises may involve collaborations 
between nonprofits and for-profits, not all such 
collaborations necessarily create a social enterprise. 
Sometimes a donative organization will simply set up a for-
profit in order to make investments that increase the size of 
its assets. It then invests donative capital in the for-profit 
entity, and the returns on that investment are distributed to 
external beneficiaries of the donative organization. One 
notable example that has existed for many years in the U.S. 
is museum shops that sell books and artwork to museum 
visitors. The shop is typically a for-profit entity owned by the 
nonprofit museum. The shop qualifies as a hybrid 
organization because it receives subsidized capital, but it has 
no commitment to transacting with disadvantaged 
individuals. Another more recent example is Housing Works, 
an organization dedicated to combating AIDS and 
 
208 See, e.g., PAUL W. HARDY, DEJA SHOE (A): CREATING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTWEAR COMPANY (1996) (University of Michigan 
CEPM Case Study). 
209 Reinhardt et al., PATAGONIA 1, supra note 203, at 26, 27. 
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homelessness.210 It is composed of several businesses, 
including a coffee shop, a secondhand bookstore, and a 
secondhand clothing store. The profits made by the shops are 
distributed to the owner, i.e., the donative organization, and 
used to allocate subsidies to external beneficiaries, especially 
through housing assistance. 
VII.  DISADVANTAGES OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
A. Mission-Drift 
A common criticism of for-profit social enterprises is that 
they have incentives to seek profits at the expense of their 
social missions.211 This criticism may broadly be divided into 
two claims. First, social enterprises have an incentive to 
transact only with patron-beneficiaries with fully 
competitive abilities and avoid those who have below-
competitive abilities. However, this is only a problem where 
the subsidies provided to the social enterprise are also 
intended to be used as disbursals to patron-beneficiaries 
with below-competitive abilities. Such subsidies may be 
distributed to the owners as profits or simply wasted. In this 
situation, the commitment device should identify the 
beneficiaries as including those with below-competitive 
abilities and specify the disbursals afforded to them. In 
practice, though, there do not seem to be many known cases 
of such problems.212 Organizations that focus on patron-
 
210 See HOUSING WORKS, http://www.housingworks.org/  
[https://perma.cc/8PSZ-RL2V] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
211 See, e.g., Nobel Laureate Muhammed Yunus Speaks Out Against 
For-Profit Microfinance from Asia-Pacific Microcred, MICROFINANCE 
TRANSPARENCY (Aug. 12, 2008), http://www.mftransparency.org/nobel-
laureate-muhammad-yunus-speaks-out-against-for-profit-microfinance-
from-asia-pacific-microcred/ [https://perma.cc/8MQ9-JKFG]. 
212 One situation when this may be possible is where the definition of 
patron-beneficiary is inadequate. Arguably, under the Fair Trade 
standards, small producers may not always be disadvantaged, such as 
where small producers’ cooperatives have sufficient capital and resources. 
See MARC SIDWELL, UNFAIR TRADE (2008). There have also been concerns 
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beneficiaries with higher abilities are usually committed to 
serving only such patrons. For example, Compartamos, 
which is often criticized for neglecting the destitute, is 
admittedly committed only to serving the vulnerable non-
poor and the moderately poor.213 There presumably is scope 
both for organizations that serve only patrons with fully 
competitive abilities and for those that also serve patron-
beneficiaries with lower abilities. Thus, nonprofit MFIs tend 
to focus more on small loans to poorer borrowers and women, 
while for-profit MFIs tend to make larger loans to less-poor 
borrowers.214 
Second, the profit motive may induce for-profit social 
enterprises to exploit their patron-beneficiaries by offering 
them unfavorable terms. The most conspicuous example is 
the recent criticism of predatory lending practices employed 
by MFIs in some regions, including exorbitant rates, 
misleading advertising, excessive penalties, and aggressive 
or illegal collection methods.215 Compartamos, for example, 
has been criticized for its loan rates, which average almost 
90%.216 
 
that some WISEs only employ workers with higher abilities. See Carlo 
Borzaga & Monica Loss, Profiles and Trajectories of Participants in 
European Work Integration Social Enterprises, in SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AT 
THE CROSSROADS OF MARKET, PUBLIC POLICIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY 169 
(Marthe Nyseens ed., 2006). 
213 COMPARTAMOS OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 26, at 77. 
214 Conning & Morduch, supra note 160, at 413–14. 
215 See id. at 411–12; Eric Bellman & Arlen Chang, India's Major 
Crisis in Microlending, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304316404575580663
294846100 [https://perma.cc/Z2EH-69WQ]; Keith Epstein & Geri Smith, 
The Ugly Side of Microlending, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2007, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2007-12-12/the-ugly-side-of-
microlending [https://perma.cc/44L8-PBJ5]. 
216  This figure includes a 15% government tax. See Elisabeth Malkin, 
Microfinance’s Success Sets off a Debate in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 
2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/05/business/worldbusiness/05micro.html 
[https://perma.cc/MP85-ARW7]. 
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The problem, however, seems to lie in the lack of effective 
regulatory frameworks to protect consumers and employees 
in many developing countries.217 In general, there are two 
main strategies to address this problem. The first strategy is 
to adopt industry standards and private monitoring in areas 
such as labor standards and consumer protection. In the 
context of MFIs, for example, there have been initiatives to 
introduce consumer protection standards to address the risk 
of predatory lending.218 The second strategy is to adopt the 
nonprofit form or to allocate ownership rights to the 
beneficiaries. The rationale for this approach is that these 
mechanisms mitigate the incentives of social enterprise 
firms to pursue profit, and therefore they are less likely to 
exploit the beneficiaries.219 Of course, as is well known, the 
downside of eliminating investor ownership is that it may 
inhibit the firm’s ability to raise capital and lower incentives 
for socially valuable innovation. 
B. Difficulties in Attracting Capital 
Although for-profit social enterprises are generally better 
at attracting capital than traditional nonprofits, they face 
difficulties in attracting equity capital. In particular, social 
enterprises that rely on control mechanisms that vest control 
of the firm in the hands of a small group of nonprofits and 
 
217 PATRICK MEAGHER, MICROFINANCE REGULATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICE 41 (2002), 
https://www.microfinancegateway.org/library/microfinance-regulation-
developing-countries-comparative-review-current-practice 
[https://perma.cc/8328-PJGX]. The high rates that Compartamos charges 
its borrowers are also partly due to the lack of competition in the Mexican 
banking industry. See Chu, supra note 28, at 127. 
218 See Brigit Helms & David Porteous, Protecting Microfinance 
Borrowers, CGAP FOCUS NOTE, May 2005, at 1 
http://www.cgap.org/publications/protecting-microfinance-borrowers 
[https://perma.cc/KDP4-ZPYF]. 
219 See Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual 
Ownership, 105 J. PUB. ECON. 39 (2013) (arguing that credit unions are 
less likely to engage in predatory pricing practices). 
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social investors have difficulty tapping equity capital 
markets since dispersed profit-seeking investors may fear 
that the firm will forego profits in order to pursue some 
unverifiable social mission. While some social enterprises do 
issue public shares, such issuances are usually of relatively 
small amounts of shares with limited voting rights. 
Additionally, the shares are often traded on matched-bargain 
systems that lack the liquidity afforded by large stock 
exchanges.220 
Social enterprises are better able to attract capital 
primarily in two situations. The first is where the costs of 
gathering information are low and the subsidies made to 
patron-beneficiaries are relatively small. Firms like 
Compartamos, which primarily serves the moderate and 
marginally poor, but not the destitute, face few information 
asymmetries and therefore do not need a significant subsidy 
to begin with. Moreover, over time, Compartamos has 
reduced the costs of lending to low-income borrowers. Thus, 
the subsidy it needs from its investors is minimal (if any), 
and the firm can generate substantial profits.221 The second 
is where consumers, donors, or the government, rather than 
the investors, pay the subsidies. Fair trade products are one 
prominent example. Usually subsidized by the consumers, 
fair trade products have become profitable businesses for 
large corporations. 
Nonetheless, there is a growing trend among institutional 
investors to invest in socially responsible businesses, 
resulting in the gradual expansion of the social investment 
 
220 See the supra Section II.A.1 (discussing Triodos Bank and 
Cafédirect); Jamie Hartzell, Creating an Ethical Stock Exchange (Aug. 
2007) (Oxford Said Bus. Sch., Skoll Ctr. for Soc. Entrepreneurship 
Working Paper), http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-
impact/skoll/research/social-finance-reports-resources/creating-ethical-
stock-exchange [https://perma.cc/28CH-EDTQ]. 
221 It is fair to claim that, at this stage, Compartamos has become a 
standard profit-maximizing firm, because it no longer receives substantial 
subsidies and it does not have a material commitment to lend to 
disadvantaged groups that lack access to capital. 
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sector.222 Recent reports suggest that there is a great deal of 
untapped capital from socially responsible funds, 
foundations, high net worth individuals, and even public 
investors.223 However, altruistic investors presumably want 
assurance that their funds are well used. Such investors may 
in principle use control or contractual mechanisms to 
monitor the social enterprise, but for many investors such 
monitoring may be too costly. Consequently, passive 
investors tend to resist investing in social enterprises whose 
efficacy they cannot oversee. Currently, with some 
exceptions, no institutional mechanisms exist to signal a 
credible commitment to such passive investors. One possible 
solution may be a certification mechanism. The Fair Trade 
certification, albeit imperfect, has proven to serve as a 
reasonably effective commitment to many dispersed 
consumers. Section IX.B below considers a broader 
certification mechanism for a wider class of social 
enterprises which would be partly directed towards altruistic 
investors as well as consumers who have limited means to 
control or directly contract with the firm. 
VIII. OTHER ACCOUNTS OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
AND HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS 
There are several other theories that have been proposed 
to explain social enterprises and hybrid organizations. As 
demonstrated below, these theories have failed to provide a 
convincing account of social enterprise and hybrid 
organizations. 
 
 
222 See supra Section VI.B. 
223 J.P. MORGAN GLOB. RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., supra 
note 3; KARIM HARJI & EDWARD T. JACKSON, E.T. JACKSON & ASSOCS. LTD., 
ACCELERATING IMPACT: ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND WHAT'S NEXT IN 
BUILDING THE IMPACT INVESTING INDUSTRY (2012), 
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/app/uploads/Accelerating-Impact-
Full-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ4X-9HSX].  
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A. Stakeholder Theories and the Costs of Decision-
Making 
The upshot of stakeholder theories is that managers 
should maximize the interests of all stakeholders of the firm, 
including employees, customers, and even the public at 
large.224 Some commentators have advanced a view of social 
enterprise and hybrid organizations as a form of for-profit 
entity that maximizes the interests of its stakeholders.225 
The major problem with these theories is that they fail to 
explain how managers should balance competing claims. 
Without providing clear criteria as to how the stakeholders’ 
interests should be considered in corporate decision-making, 
broad managerial discretion enables managers to pursue 
their own interests.226 Hybrid organizations with broad social 
and environmental missions are particularly vulnerable to 
this risk because of the difficulty of defining and verifying 
what kind of action maximizes the social mission. 
 
224 There are numerous articles on the topic.  See, e.g., Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the 
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005). To be sure, most proponents 
of shareholder primacy agree that a corporation can and should act in the 
interests of its stakeholders and society as a whole to the extent that doing 
so indirectly promotes the shareholders’ interest. See Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439 (2001); Michael C. Jensen et al., Value Maximization, Stakeholder 
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working 
Paper No. 00-058, 2000), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=768189&cftoken=41041396&
abstract_id=220671## [https://perma.cc/L32L-R4LK]. 
225 See generally THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 
9; THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE WORLD OF SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISES, supra note 10; SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AT THE CROSSROADS OF 
MARKET, PUBLIC POLICIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 212.  
226 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 224, at 447–49; Jensen et al., 
supra note 224. 
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Stakeholder theories also advocate allocating voting 
rights and decision-making power to specific stakeholders.227 
In fact, in some social enterprises, such as FTSEs, there may 
be board members that represent a class of beneficiaries228 or 
a class of beneficiaries that owns some shares in the firm.229 
Only rarely, however, do beneficiaries truly take an active 
part in decision-making, mainly because such a decision-
making process could be highly cumbersome due to potential 
conflicts among different stakeholders. 
By contrast, decision-making in social enterprises seems 
to be relatively efficient in resolving conflicts among 
stakeholders. The reason is that the commitment device not 
only serves as a credible commitment to utilizing subsidies 
effectively, but it also mitigates the costs of decision-making 
by defining how managers should utilize the subsidies. 
Certification and contractual mechanisms define the class of 
beneficiaries and the terms of their transactions with the 
enterprise. Control mechanisms may potentially be 
susceptible to tension between investors who want to 
maximize profits and the nonprofit controllers who are 
satisfied with below-market returns. However, as long as the 
nonprofit maintains clear control of the social enterprise 
firm, there seems to be relatively little scope for conflict. 
Accordingly, managers are left with the task of pursuing 
profits, subject to the commitment to transact with a class of 
 
227 See Jacques Defourny, Introduction: From Third Sector to Social 
Enterprise, in THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 9; 
Jeffrey Moriarty, The Connection Between Stakeholder Theory and 
Stakeholder Democracy: An Excavation and Defense, 53 BUS. & SOC’Y 820 
(2012). 
228 For example, the producers of Cafédirect, an FTSE that sells hot 
drinks, have the right to appoint two directors to its board. CAFÉDIRECT, 
supra note 52, at 8–9. 
229 For example, the borrowers of Grameen Bank, a prominent MFI in 
Bangladesh, hold approximately 76% of its shares as of 2015. GRAMEEN 
BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 59 (2016), http://www.grameen.com/wp-
content/uploads/bsk-pdf-manager/GB-2015_33.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP6P-
XRV4]. 
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beneficiaries. In this way, the commitment device effectively 
defines how to balance the profit and nonprofit missions 
against each other, so that the margin of discretion left to 
managers is relatively limited. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the 
measurement theory of social enterprises is not necessarily 
inconsistent with stakeholder theories whose ultimate 
objective is to create organizations that benefit non-
shareholder groups. Instead, it asserts that in order to do 
this effectively, the organization must have an actual stake 
in the development of the beneficiaries, rather than rely on 
broad managerial discretion. Thus, social enterprises may be 
viewed as a practical mechanism for operationalizing the 
stakeholder model. 
B. Economies of Scope 
Malani & Posner (“MP”)230 and Henderson & Malani 
(“HM,” and together “MPH”)231 argue that for-profits are 
more efficient than nonprofits in pursuing social goals 
because they benefit from economies of scope.232 A car 
company may have more ample resources and knowledge 
than nonprofits to invest in research on hybrid engines than 
government or nonprofits. However, other examples provided 
by MPH have questionable theoretical and empirical 
support. For example, they suggest that multinational coffee 
companies are more efficient in disbursing charity to poor 
farmers. As discussed above, however, multinational 
companies have generally avoided transacting with poor 
disaggregated farmers primarily because the costs of 
transacting with those farmers tend to be high. In fact, the 
 
230 Malani & Posner, supra note 6. 
231 M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and 
the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571 (2009). 
232 For elaborate criticisms, see Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 1213 (2010); James R. Hines Jr. et al., The Attack on 
Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179 
(2010). 
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contacts between most large firms and small farmers are 
initiated and fostered by nonprofits.233 To take another 
example, MPH argue that clothing and footwear 
manufacturers, such as Nike, are better positioned than 
nonprofits to monitor the working conditions in factories in 
developing countries. Surely, every organization that is 
contravening certain standards is best positioned to ensure 
that such standards are held in compliance. But clearly, such 
manufacturers have an obvious incentive to shirk on the 
quality of working conditions to save costs. In fact, the 
pressure on such manufacturers comes from various 
nonprofits. Accordingly, the efficiency claim is not 
convincing. 
MPH also claim that for-profits are just as trustworthy or 
committed as nonprofits.234 Donors or subsidy providers do 
not need to patronize a nonprofit to use their funds for 
charitable purposes; rather, they can simply channel their 
donation or subsidy through a for-profit firm. The non-
distribution constraint is not essential as a commitment 
device. For-profits can simply commit by contract not to 
distribute profits and a private auditor can monitor this 
commitment.235 However, the feasibility of this contract 
depends on the availability of measurable standards.236 
Moreover, even if firms could enter into such a contract, in 
practice virtually none of the examples of for-profit charities 
discussed by MPH involve such a contract. These examples 
include: Google’s charitable arm; fair trade coffee sold by 
Starbucks; and Nike’s abstinence from purchasing supplies 
from sweatshops. None of these firms have contracted to not 
distribute profits to their owners. Accordingly, MPH fail to 
 
233 For examples, see AUSTIN & REAVIS, supra note 127; Argenti, supra 
note 127. 
234 Malani & Posner, supra note 6, at 2035–36.   
235 Id.   
236 For a detailed criticism of private monitoring of the non-
distribution constraint, see Galle, supra note 232, at 1218–21. 
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describe what substitutes for the non-distribution constraint 
for-profits have adopted as commitment devices. 
C. Public Good Theories 
The above discussion assumes that social enterprises are 
designed for the benefit of a specified class of patrons, such 
as consumers or employees. In practice, the role of social 
enterprises may be viewed as one of generating public goods. 
For example, MFIs and CDFIs are widely regarded as tools 
for alleviating poverty. Social enterprises, on this view, are 
supposed to benefit external beneficiaries who are affiliated 
with the patron-beneficiaries. A borrower that receives a 
loan from an MFI or works at a WISE may be able to send 
his or her children to school and obtain better healthcare 
services. Likewise, the availability of healthcare services, 
medicines, or products such as eyeglasses, enhances 
productivity and reduces the costs of illness. 
However, the evidence on the effects of social enterprises 
as providers of public goods is largely equivocal. MFIs are a 
case in point. Empirical studies show no clear evidence that 
MFIs uniformly alleviate poverty and improve the standard 
of living in a given community in areas such as healthcare 
and education.237 On the other hand, there is strong evidence 
that access to credit has improved the lives of the borrowers 
 
237 See, e.g., Abhijit Banerjee et al., The Miracle of Microfinance? 
Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t. of 
Econ. Working Paper No. 13-09, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250500 
[https://perma.cc/Y766-8LCH]; Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 
Expanding Microenterprise Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply 
Decision to Estimate the Impacts in Manila (Yale Econ. Dep’t Working 
Paper No. 68, 2009), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1444990 
[https://perma.cc/SV2W-6WKM]; David Roodman & Jonathan Morduch, 
The Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in Bangladesh: Revisiting the 
Evidence (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 174, 2013), 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1422302 
[https://perma.cc/J5DY-XL9N]. 
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themselves.238 It seems to be the case, then, that the patron-
beneficiaries of MFIs have substantially benefited from the 
ability to transact with MFIs, while the benefits to the 
community at large are inconclusive. 
The distinction between patron-beneficiaries and external 
beneficiaries may be the reason for these results. The 
positive externalities which arguably flow to external 
beneficiaries of MFIs are somewhat uncertain and may 
depend on numerous factors. For example, the availability of 
credit may improve a family’s financial situation, but 
without educational opportunities or the availability of 
healthcare services, it will do little to improve education or 
health. There is similar empirical data with respect to fair 
trade and its effect on communities of small farmers.239 The 
ability to transact with FTSEs has increased the income of 
individual farmers and their households, but though there is 
some evidence of modest positive effects on education and 
health, it is inconclusive and falls short of showing clear 
results.240 
In fact, consistent with the claim of this Article, most 
social enterprises simply evaluate their impact by measuring 
the extent to which they transact with patron-beneficiaries, 
for example, the total output sold to low-income consumers 
(e.g., bed nets sold), the number of disadvantaged workers 
 
238 Banerjee et al., supra note 237 (finding that microcredit supports 
household borrowing and investments and the creation and expansion of 
small businesses, but has no impact on health, education and women’s 
decision-making); COLLINS ET AL., supra note 142 (claiming that 
microfinance may be most effective at smoothing out borrowers’ cash 
flows, so that poor borrowers are less vulnerable to fluctuations in their 
income); Karlan & Zinman, supra note 237 (finding that the introduction 
of micro-lending to new populations leads to an increase in business 
profits for male borrowers, but no overall effects on income or poverty). 
239 For a review of impact studies, see NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 
45, at 201–28; Ann Le Mare, The Impact of Fair Trade on Social and 
Economic Development: A Review of the Literature, 2/6 GEOGRAPHY 
COMPASS 1922 (2008). 
240 NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 45, at 208–09; Le Mare, supra note 
239. 
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employed, or the number of loans made.241 Note that by 
definition these transactions would not have taken place 
without social enterprises. Accordingly, it appears to be 
relatively easier to measure the effects of social enterprises 
on their patron-beneficiaries.242 Vis-à-vis their external 
beneficiaries, social enterprises are in a similar position to 
donative organizations; unless the benefits to external 
beneficiaries are measurable at reasonable cost, they remain 
uncertain. 
D. Sustainability and Scale 
Several commentators have suggested that social 
enterprises have emerged as a solution to capital constraints 
faced by donative organizations. According to this view, 
social enterprises are more financially sustainable than 
donative organizations because they can generate revenues. 
Donative organizations are ineffective in pursuing their 
missions due to limited funding from donors.243 Greater 
 
241 See ALNOOR EBRAHIM & V. KASTURI RANGAN, ACUMEN FUND: 
MEASUREMENT IN VENTURE PHILANTHROPY (A) (2009), 
http://acumen.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Case-Study-HBS-Ecotact-
Meridian.pdf  [https://perma.cc/J9LJ-BWMF]; GREYSTON, ANNUAL REPORT 
2015 6 (2016), http://greyston.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/greyston_report_2015_02_online_pk_sm.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/VD47-DRZB] (144 disadvantaged workers employed); 
CARVER FED. SAV. BANK, WE ARE THE COMMUNITY 2 (2016), 
https://www.carverbank.com/brochure#page/4 [https://perma.cc/QT4N-
SRDP] (152 commercial loans originated). 
242 To be sure, certain methodological difficulties exist also when 
measuring impact with respect to patron-beneficiaries, and most studies 
are subject to some weaknesses, including (a) difficulties in assessing 
counterfactuals, i.e., the hypothetical situation if patron-beneficiaries had 
not transacted with the social enterprise, and (b) selection biases, e.g., 
social enterprises may choose to transact with patron-beneficiaries with 
higher abilities. 
243 MUHAMMAD YUNUS, CREATING A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY: 
SOCIAL BUSINESS AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM (2008); PALLOTTA, 
supra note 161; Dees, supra note 9, 55–56; Jerr Boschee & Jim McClurg, 
Towards a Better Understanding of Social Entrepreneurship (2003) 
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sources of revenue enable social enterprises to scale the 
firm’s operations.244 Without scaling, firms cannot reach a 
large number of beneficiaries and have a substantial social 
impact. For example, an MFI with a small number of 
borrowers arguably has only a modest social impact, whereas 
one with numerous branches and borrowers has a larger 
social impact. Some go further by arguing that the ability to 
distribute profits and tap equity capital is critical to 
obtaining the capital necessary to scale the firms’ operations, 
and hence their social impact; for example, a for-profit MFI 
can reach more borrowers than a nonprofit MFI.245 
These views, however, suffer from several weaknesses. 
First, there is no systematic evidence that earned income is 
more sustainable than donative income.246 Donative 
organizations, such as large foundations and aid agencies, 
have very substantial funds. The real problem is that the 
utilization of these funds, particularly towards development 
goals, has often been ineffective.247 In fact, there is little 
reason to believe that simply increasing the amounts of 
donations would generate different results. Second, evidence 
suggests that nonprofits with no access to equity capital can 
achieve a substantial scale similar to that of for-profits. 
Nonprofit MFIs, such as ASA and BRAC, serve millions of 
borrowers and have as wide a reach as for-profit MFIs.248 In 
 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-
programs/courses/fileDL.php?fID=7289 [https://perma.cc/7UUV-BHW5];. 
244 YUNUS, supra note 243; J.P. MORGAN GLOB. RESEARCH & THE 
ROCKEFELLER FOUND., supra note 3, at 13. 
245 See Chu, supra note 28. 
246 Beth Battle Anderson & J. Gregory Dees, Rhetoric, Reality, and 
Research: Building a Solid Foundation for the Practice of Social 
Entrepreneurship, in SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: NEW MODELS OF 
SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 9, at 144, 148–50. 
247 See supra note 84. 
248 In Bangladesh, ASA and BRAC served around 6 million and 5 
million respectively in 2015. See ASA, THE MIX, 
https://www.themix.org/mixmarket/profiles/asa [https://perma.cc/C9AK-
8HAN] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017); BRAC, THE MIX, 
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some cases, attracting equity capital may be necessary for 
scaling. As explained above, however, when social 
enterprises transact with beneficiaries with lower abilities, 
equity capital is less likely to be available, and subsidies in 
the form of donations and income tax exemptions remain 
essential.249 
To be sure, social enterprises are better than donative 
organizations at scaling their social impact. But the reason 
for this is that social enterprises allocate subsidies more 
efficiently. For example, while a donative organization might 
distribute a good (e.g., a bed net) worth $5 to say 200 
beneficiaries, a social enterprise using the same amount of 
subsidies (i.e., $1,000) may be able to distribute the good to 
100 beneficiaries that cannot afford to pay for it, and sell the 
rest for say, $3 to 250 beneficiaries (i.e., $2 subsidy per 
beneficiary) that can afford to pay this amount. In this 
example, the social enterprise can reach more beneficiaries 
(350 as compared with 100) because it has more information 
on beneficiaries’ abilities to pay. The measurement role of 
social enterprises thus enables them to scale their social 
impact as compared to donative organizations. 
IX. LEGAL HYBRID FORMS AND HOW TO REFORM 
THEM 
Many U.S. states and different countries have introduced 
new legal hybrid forms in recent years. The main purpose of 
such legal forms is to facilitate the flow of subsidized capital 
to for-profit social enterprises from a growing class of 
altruistic investors, ethically conscious consumers, private 
foundations, and even government. As pointed out above, a 
great deal of untapped capital is potentially available for 
investments in firms that promote social purposes at below-
market returns,250 and there is evidence that ethically-
 
https://www.themix.org/mixmarket/profiles/brac [https://perma.cc/J9KN-
598R] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
249 See supra Section VII.B. 
250 Id. 
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conscious consumers are increasingly willing to pay 
significant premiums over market prices for products of 
firms that do good.251 
Gaining access to this capital is a particular problem for 
for-profit social enterprises because they lack a standardized 
commitment device (such as the non-distribution constraint) 
to assure their investors, customers, and the government 
that they utilize subsidies effectively, and there is an obvious 
risk that those who control an organization will expropriate 
the subsidies it receives.252 Most investors and consumers do 
not have resources to monitor closely the social purpose of 
the firm they invest in or buy products from, especially when 
measuring social impact is uncertain. The costs of control 
and contractual commitment devices are high and require 
substantial monitoring. Moreover, foundations face 
substantial regulatory hurdles in making investments in 
social enterprises, also known as “program related 
investments” (“PRIs”), and may be subject to tax penalties or 
even lose their exempt status if they fail to monitor the social 
purpose of such investments.253 To reassure providers of 
 
251 The mean premium for socially responsible products was recently 
estimated to be about 17% over market prices of equivalent products. 
Stephanie M. Tully & Russell S. Winer, The Role of the Beneficiary in 
Willingness to Pay for Socially Responsible Products: A Meta-analysis, 90 
J. RETAILING 255 (2014). 
252 As explained above, this is essentially the role of the non-
distribution constraint in the case of nonprofit corporations. See supra 
Section III.A. 
253 A detailed analysis of PRIs is outside the scope of this Article. In 
summary, PRIs are subsidized investments by private foundations in 
firms that promote one of the well known exempt purposes, such as 
educational, scientific, literary or charitable purpose. 26 U.S.C § 4944(c) 
(2016). The main advantage of PRIs is that they count towards 
foundations’ minimum annual distribution requirements. 26 C.F.R. 
§ 53.4942(a)–3(a)(2) (2016). The main problem with PRIs is that for 
investments to qualify as PRIs, foundations need to follow detailed and 
costly procedures which are set out in the expenditure responsibility rules, 
including monitoring the investees and making reports to the IRS. 26 
U.S.C. § 4945(h) (2016); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945–5 (2016). Failure to follow 
these rules could result in the foundation’s paying significant tax penalties 
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subsidized capital and income, legal hybrid forms must 
identify a particular structure that gives hybrid 
organizations incentives to utilize subsidies effectively. In 
this way, such forms can verify that certain for-profits firms 
can be trusted to employ subsidies to benefit third parties. 
As argued below, existing legal hybrids fail to do this, 
mainly because they rely on a vague notion of combining 
profit and social mission. Consequently, most social 
enterprises continue to use the existing legal forms. 
Although an increasing number of small businesses are 
using these forms mainly for marketing purposes,254 few of 
them seem to have a particularly important social impact, 
and those that do usually retain the same structure and 
social mission that they had before they converted from the 
for-profit form.255 Moreover, despite the recent IPO of 
Laureate Education Inc.—the first IPO by a Benefit 
Corporation—it is unlikely that legal hybrid forms will 
facilitate liquid public markets for true social enterprises.256 
Finally, despite lobbying attempts to allow some form of tax 
subsidy for businesses that incorporate as legal hybrids, no 
 
or even losing its tax-exempt status. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 8. 
Consequently, few foundations make any PRIs. See LILLY FAMILY SCH. OF 
PHILANTHROPY, LEVERAGING THE POWER OF FOUNDATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
PROGRAM-RELATED INVESTING 2 (2013), 
https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/files/research/complete_report_final_51713.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6UP5-WE6Z]. 
254 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable 
Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 607 (2011); Jen 
Friedman, The Benefit Corporation: A Tool for Building a Sustainable 
Brand, CMO (Apr. 22, 2015), 
http://www.cmo.com/opinion/articles/2015/4/20/the-benefit-corporation-a-
tool-for-building-a-sustainable-brand.html#gs.wDIcMVk 
[https://perma.cc/S4JE-QBX3]. 
255 The Greyston Bakery discussed infra is one example. See infra 
note 270 and accompanying text. 
256 For discussion of Laureate Education, see supra text 
accompanying notes 12–13. 
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such subsidy has been introduced.257 Perhaps more 
importantly, investments in legal hybrid forms have not 
been recognized as PRIs, and therefore few foundations have 
made investments in such firms.258 
The following discussion first describes the legal hybrid 
forms, and in particular the Benefit Corporation. It then 
outlines a potential reform that can address the deficiencies 
in such forms. In particular, this Section argues that in order 
to serve as a credible commitment device, the design of legal 
hybrid forms should be based on the notion of transacting 
with the beneficiaries advanced in this article. 
A. Legal Hybrid Forms 
Two prominent examples of hybrid forms are the Low-
Profit Limited Liability Company (“L3C”) and the Benefit 
Corporation. The L3C is a Limited Liability Company 
(“LLC”) that significantly furthers the accomplishment of 
one or more charitable or educational purposes, and no 
significant purpose of the company is the production of 
income or the appreciation of property.259 Realizing profit 
and enhancing value can be purposes of the enterprise as 
long as they are not significant purposes. This definition 
reflects the notion of mixed mission that underlies the 
common definition of hybrid organizations. Merely stating 
that a firm has a mixed mission, however, is unlikely to give 
subsidy providers reasonable assurance that their subsidy is 
being used effectively, especially given the difficulty of 
measuring social impact. Moreover, it is hard to see what the 
L3C adds over and above the standard LLC form, since 
members of an LLC can simply add a provision to the LLC 
agreement that contractually commits all of them to a 
particular social purpose. 
 
257 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social 
Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV. 387, 390–91 (2014). 
258 Callison & Vestal, supra note 8, at 279. 
259 For the Vermont L3C Act (the first L3C statute), see 11 VT. STAT. 
ANN. § 3001(27) (2008) (repealed 2016). 
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Benefit Corporations are defined as corporations whose 
purpose is to create a “general public benefit.” General public 
benefit in most states’ statutes means “a material positive 
impact on society and the environment.”260 Specific benefits 
include some activities associated with social enterprises as 
defined here, for example, providing beneficial services and 
products to low-income communities. However, they go 
further to include largely any social purpose, including for 
example “conferring any other particular benefit on society 
or the environment.”261 Accordingly, just like the L3C, the 
Benefit Corporation is based on the concept of mixed 
mission. Partly to address the uncertainty inherent in this 
concept, the Benefit Corporation statutes of most states 
require that impact on society and the environment be 
measured by a third-party standard,262 i.e., a social rating 
certifier.263 As discussed above, however, social ratings 
themselves are subject to many imperfections, and may 
provide poor information to consumers or other subsidy 
providers on the social value of hybrid organizations. 
In addition, Benefit Corporation statutes include strong 
constituency provisions that require directors and officers to 
consider the interests of different stakeholders, including 
 
260 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2014), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Le
gislation.pdf  [https://perma.cc/S7DY-3XAG] [hereinafter MODEL 
LEGISLATION]. 
261 MODEL LEGISLATION § 102. Under the Delaware Code, “Public 
benefit” means “a positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on 1 or 
more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other than 
stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited 
to, effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, 
environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological 
nature.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(b) (2014). 
262 Third-party standard is defined as “a recognized standard for 
defining, reporting, and assessing corporate social and environmental 
performance.” MODEL LEGISLATION § 102. Note that under Delaware law, 
certification by a third-party standard is only optional. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2014). 
263 The certifier is often B-Lab, although other certifiers may be used. 
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customers, employees, the community in which the firm 
operates, the local and global environment, and any other 
group that the directors deem appropriate.264 The major risk 
of such provisions is that directors may use them mainly to 
entrench themselves at the expense of shareholders and 
potentially other stakeholders. Although shareholders with 
more than two percent holdings could sue the directors for 
failure to pursue public or specific benefits,265 the directors 
have ample discretion as to the weight they choose to give to 
the interests of different groups, and they need not give 
priority to any particular consideration or factors.266 
Moreover, as in standard business corporations, directors 
and officers have the protection of the business judgment 
rule, which largely means that if they were informed and 
acted in good faith, they are considered to have fulfilled their 
duties.267 The ability of directors of Benefit Corporations to 
entrench themselves, coupled with the weakness of many 
social rating standards, makes the Benefit Corporation a 
questionable vehicle for attracting subsidies from consumers, 
investors, and the government.268 
 
264 MODEL LEGISLATION §§ 301(a), 303(a). 
265 Id. § 305. 
266 Id. § 301(a)(3). For example, the Delaware Benefit Corporation 
statute states that directors need to balance “the pecuniary interests of the 
stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the 
corporation's conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits 
identified in its certificate of incorporation.” See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
365(a). 
267 MODEL LEGISLATION §§ 301(e), 303(e). 
268 In fact, the early evidence on Benefit Corporations shows that a 
significant portion of them choose to incorporate in Nevada. See Ellen 
Berrey, How Many Benefit Corporations Are There? (May 5, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602781 
[https://perma.cc/KX6Q-FKKC]. Nevada is a state known for its 
managerialist corporate laws that exempt managers from fiduciary duties 
by default. See Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada 
as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935 (2012). While pro-
managerial laws may not necessarily harm the value of small firms that 
typically self-select into Nevada, they raise particular concerns when 
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To be sure, the Benefit Corporation form does include 
helpful provisions for owners that want to commit to some 
social purpose. In particular, termination of Benefit 
Corporation status must be approved by a qualified 
majority—typically two-thirds—of the shareholders.269 This 
provision effectively gives one-third of the shareholders 
control over the mission. In fact, the Greyston Bakery 
recently converted into a New York Benefit Corporation, 
probably in anticipation of the Greyston Foundation’s selling 
a stake to for-profit investors but maintaining control of the 
firm.270 However, while this provision is helpful in creating a 
form of control mechanism, the same commitment device can 
be created with existing legal forms, for example, by adding 
a charter provision that gives a nonprofit control over the 
firm’s mission.271 Moreover, this type of control mechanism 
on its own may have limited utility as a commitment device 
to a large class of consumers, who may not know which 
 
managers are given untrammeled discretion to pursue vague and largely 
undefined public benefits. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, 
Nevada and the Market for Corporate Law, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165 
(2012); Ofer Eldar, Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value? 
Evidence from Nevada (on file with author). 
269 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11a § 21.07 (2016). 
270 See Benefit Corporation, GREYSTON BAKERY, 
http://greyston.com/the-bakery-open-hiring/benefit-corporation/ 
[https://perma.cc/8UFY-W8RT] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017); New York law 
actually requires a three-fourths majority for terminating the Benefit 
Corporation status. See 17 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1702, 1705 (McKinney 
2012). Similarly, Patagonia, an environmentally friendly firm 
reincorporated as a California Benefit Corporation to benefit from a 
similar provision. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14604 (West 2012); supra Section 
VI.D. 
271 See supra Section V.C. As discussed above, though, some 
statements by Chancellor Chandler in Ebay v. Newark suggest that it is 
not possible to commit a Delaware corporation to a social purpose. See 
supra note 4. But, as pointed out in supra note 4, the eBay case did not 
involve a specific charter provision that required the firm to pursue a 
social mission. Rather, the court reviewed the legality of a poison pill 
mechanism adopted by management against minority shareholders’ will. 
See id. 
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owners control the social mission and would therefore need 
to rely on the third party rating. 
B. Outline for Reform 
The core of the following reform proposal is to shift the 
focus of legal hybrid forms from organizations with mixed 
missions to firms that commit to transacting with 
disadvantaged groups as investees, workers, producers, 
consumers, etc. This reform may be achieved by simply 
modifying the Benefit Corporation and certification system. 
Details of this reform will be discussed in future work;272 for 
present purposes, its main features are outlined below. 
First, this requires a new form of certification for social 
enterprise. Certification would be awarded if a certain 
percentage of the business of the firm, including its affiliates, 
is based on transactions with a set of carefully defined 
classes of beneficiaries. The beneficiaries would be defined by 
reference to certain criteria of need (for example, levels of 
income, disability, or location). Certification may be 
conducted by a private organization, similar to Fair Trade 
certification. It may also be conducted by a newly formed 
government agency, similar to the CDFI Fund. The main 
innovation is that the certification would apply to a wider 
class of beneficiaries, including, for example, low-income 
workers. To keep the certification sufficiently flexible, 
different types of beneficiaries (e.g., borrowers) may be 
divided into subclasses in accordance with some measures of 
need.273 Most states’ Benefit Corporation statutes do 
recognize the need for certifying social impact. However, 
they are misguided in requiring firms to certify a 
comprehensive social impact standard that is inherently 
 
272 Eldar, supra note 21. 
273 Creating standards for different classes of beneficiaries would be 
particularly challenging if these criteria extend to developing countries. 
However, collaboration among a federal agency, multilateral organizations 
such as the World Bank, and NGOs should be able to address this 
challenge. See Eldar, supra note 21. 
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uncertain. If B-Corp or another certification, private or 
governmental, focused primarily on verifying the 
transactional relationship with disadvantaged groups, it 
could serve as a credible commitment device. 
Second, Benefit Corporations would be required to obtain 
this certification. Whereas under the current version of the 
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, firms have freedom 
to choose a third party standard to measure their social 
purpose, firms would be limited to one type of certification. 
Certification would also require Benefit Corporations to 
include an explicit commitment in the firm’s certificate of 
incorporation (or other equivalent constitutional document) 
to transact with one or more classes of disadvantaged 
groups. Moreover, the name of Benefit Corporation would be 
changed to include “BC” (for “Benefit Corporation”) or “SE” 
(for “Social Enterprise”) as a suffix. This way, when investors 
buy their shares or when consumers buy their products, they 
would have notice that the firm transacts with a class of 
beneficiaries, and hence it is likely to use subsidies 
effectively. 
In this respect, some of the provisions of Benefit 
Corporations may be superfluous while others remain 
valuable. On the one hand, the provisions requiring 
managers to consider the interest of all stakeholders have 
limited utility and would be unnecessary under this 
proposal. Subject to the certification, Benefit Corporations 
could pursue profits like any other commercial firm. On the 
other hand, there is value in keeping the provisions that 
require a super-majority for terminating the Benefit 
Corporation status. This way, investors, whether individuals 
or foundations, would have assurance that the firm will not 
change its mission after investors have already invested 
capital to support the social mission of the firm. 
This proposal may not be as provocative as it may first 
appear. As discussed above, CDFIs already operate well 
under a federal certification regime that verifies that they 
serve specified target markets, and Fair Trade certification 
has become part of mainstream retail. Moreover, in several 
European jurisdictions there are hybrid legal forms, which 
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are exclusively designed for firms certified as WISEs if a 
percentage of their workers belong to disadvantaged 
groups.274 A centralized federal agency focused on 
development missions could be established to certify a wider 
range of social enterprises. In fact, even the nonprofit form 
may be viewed as a system whereby there is a government 
certifier, i.e., the Internal Revenue Service, that primarily 
ensures that nonprofits are precluded from distributing 
profits (and hence, are more likely to distribute them to their 
beneficiaries), and state corporation law governs the internal 
affairs of the firm. 
This reform has the potential for unlocking much-needed 
capital for social entrepreneurs. It would enable dispersed 
investors and consumers to donate more funds to social 
enterprises. To this extent, it may also enable social 
enterprises to issue public shares. Moreover, it could 
potentially serve as the basis for allocating tax benefits to 
social enterprises. Investments in the reformed Benefit 
Corporations could qualify automatically as PRIs by 
foundations. The social enterprise certification proposed 
above could, in this respect, replace the complicated and 
cumbersome process for making and approving PRIs; the 
reason is that certified Benefit Corporations would be 
structured such that they have incentives to pursue 
development missions effectively. In fact, most PRIs are 
actually made in businesses that have transactional 
relationships with their beneficiaries, such as businesses 
that employ low-income individuals.275 By streamlining the 
PRI process and relieving foundations of potential liabilities 
for making PRIs, this proposal could facilitate the flow of 
substantial capital to social enterprises. 
 
274 One prominent example is the Type B Italian social cooperative. 
See Cafaggi & Iamiceli, supra note 5, at 7–15. 
275 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944–3 (2016). These examples include businesses 
owned by members of economically disadvantaged or minority groups, 
businesses that sell agricultural products sourced from low-income 
farmers in depressed rural areas, and a variety of low-cost providers of 
essential goods and services, such as vaccines sold in developing countries. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
Social enterprise and other hybrid organizations are often 
discussed as an alternative to the traditional form of 
capitalism, which is based on the norms of profit-
maximization and shareholder primacy. These accounts tend 
to define social enterprises and hybrids simply as 
organizations that mix profit-seeking with social missions or 
firms with duties towards multiple stakeholders. The theory 
offered here effectively dispels such claims because the role it 
ascribes to social enterprises is not intrinsically inconsistent 
with the traditional role of corporations. Social enterprises 
can be profit-maximizing if the subsidies they receive flow 
from government or consumers rather than from owners. 
Even if the owners do provide the subsidies, social 
enterprises may still act under a shareholder primacy norm 
as long as the owners agree to provide such subsidies. 
Accordingly, the theoretical underpinning of social enterprise 
is not, as some have argued, its apparent divergence from 
profit-maximization or shareholder primacy. At the same 
time, the theory is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
objective of stakeholder models either, since social 
enterprises are clearly structured to benefit non-shareholder 
groups. Rather, the theory may be viewed as an effective way 
to implement such models by giving firms a financial stake in 
the development of their beneficiaries. 
The main contribution of the theory advanced here is to 
identify the measurement role of social enterprises, and to 
distinguish them from other hybrid organizations that 
mainly engage in transferring subsidies to third party 
beneficiaries. Organizations that give or transfer subsidies, 
such as donative organizations or firms that engage in 
corporate charity, work well mainly when the purpose of the 
subsidies is relatively simple and hence there are no 
information problems regarding their impact. Social 
enterprises are designed to use subsidies to promote complex 
missions, such as increasing employment opportunities or 
facilitating access to credit. The commitment of social 
enterprises to transacting with their beneficiaries is the key 
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element in assuring subsidy providers that their subsidies 
will be used effectively. This commitment essentially aligns 
the interests of the firm with those of the subsidy providers. 
Given their dependence on the performance of their 
beneficiaries, social enterprises have an interest in ensuring 
that the subsidies are not wasted and that beneficiaries are 
provided with the optimal amount and type of disbursal. In 
this way, the interests of social enterprises are aligned with 
the interests of subsidy providers who presumably want 
their subsidy to be used effectively. 
The theory advanced in this Article may also inform legal 
policy. It suggests that legal policy and, particularly, legal 
hybrid forms should focus on a specific set of enterprises that 
serve a measurement function. The limited usefulness of new 
legal hybrid forms, such as the L3C or the Benefit 
Corporation, is to a large extent due to their questionable 
theoretical underpinnings. Legal forms for incorporating 
firms with mixed missions inevitably fail to identify the 
essential elements that make firms effective in utilizing 
subsidies or to prescribe adequate commitment devices. It is 
therefore not surprising that such forms have generally 
failed to attract subsidies from tax authorities,276 which tend 
to view them with suspicion. 
Finally, this Article outlined a summary proposal for 
reforming the Benefit Corporation and introducing a 
certification mechanism for social enterprises that transact 
with a wide range of disadvantaged groups. This proposal, 
which builds on the success of both private certifications 
such as Fair Trade, and government programs such as the 
CDFI Fund, has the potential to facilitate the flow of capital 
and income to social enterprises from a wide range of 
altruistic investors and consumers. It is also likely to serve 
as the basis for allocating tax benefits and government 
subsidies to social enterprises, and especially for facilitating 
program related investments from private foundations. 
 
 
276 Callison & Vestal, supra note 8. 
